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INTRODUCTION 
Having been incorporated into the European Union on May 1
st
, 2004, Estonia is 
obligated to follow the policy procedures laid out in EU directive 2003-54-EC, Internal 
Market in Electricity Directive
1
. The purpose of this directive is to establish common 
rules applicable to all EU member states for the administration and participation in an 
internal market for electricity.  
EU directive 2003-54-EC was enacted in 2003 to replace EU directive 96-92-
EC, which initiated the process of electricity market liberalization within the EU in 
1996
2
. The purpose of EU directive 96-92-EC was to ―unbundle‖ – that is, separate – 
the administrative activities of vertically integrated electricity system operators, 
presenting a ―separate balance sheet for each activity [balancing voltage supply, 
maintaining voltage level, and restarting the system upon complete collapse]‖ (Meeus, 
Purchala, and Belmans 2005, pg. 28). EU directive 2003-54-EC goes a step further, 
requiring vertically integrated electricity system operators to unbundle these activities to 
the extent that they are carried out by separate legal entities (ibid.). The stated aims of 
EU directive 2003-54-EC are
3
: 
 to maintain a secure, reliable and efficient electricity distribution system in its 
area with due regard for the environment; 
 to ensure non-discrimination between system users; 
                                                          
1 Eesti Riigikogu, "Estonian Electricity Sector Development Plan", Regulation No. 5 of the Government of
 the Republic of Estonia, 3 January 2006 (p. 2) 
2
 Meeus L., Purchala K., Belmans R., "Development of the Internal Electricity Market in Europe", The
 Electricity Journal, Volume 18, Issue 6, July 2005, p 25-35 (p. 26) 
3
 European Union (Europa), "Internal market for energy: common rules for the internal market in
 electricity", Europa, 5-29-2009, Accessed on 10-3-2010, 
<http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/energy/european_energy_policy/l27005_en.htm> 
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 to provide system users with the information they need for efficient access to the 
system; 
 to give priority to generating installations using renewable energy sources or 
waste or producing combined heat and power; 
 to procure the energy they use to cover energy losses and reserve capacity in 
their system according to transparent, non-discriminatory and market-based 
procedures; 
 to take energy efficiency/demand-side management and/or distributed generation 
measures that supplant the need to upgrade or replace capacity. 
Estonia faces several challenges in implementing the procedures laid out in the 
Internal Market in Electricity Directive, but this thesis will explore one challenge in 
particular: the effect of electricity market liberalization in Estonia on its electricity 
security. This will be undertaken by addressing the central research question of this 
thesis: 
What effect does electricity market liberalization have on a country’s energy security? 
 
Organization of this thesis 
This thesis comprises an introduction, six chapters, and a conclusion. The 
introduction will establish the practical groundwork of the thesis by outlining and 
defining the main topics of discussion: electricity markets, electricity market 
liberalization, and energy security. The introduction will also identify the purpose of 
using Estonia to address the research question, the main contributions of this thesis to 
the existing academic literature, and the research focus, hypothesis, and methods of this 
thesis. 
The first chapter will outline the theoretical framework of this thesis. A 
theoretical framework is important for contextualizing a topic that bridges abstract 
economic theory with political determinants and empirical research. The theoretical 
framework is one of the main contributions of this thesis. The second chapter outlines 
Estonia‘s energy situation, including its resource usage and access, its connection to the 
3 
 
Baltic electricity grid, and its dependence on Russian energy supplies. The third chapter 
discusses the electricity market reforms mandated by the EU, both past and present. 
This includes an overview of the two initial electricity market reforms and their effects 
(on electricity supplies, market concentration via mergers and acquisitions, and energy 
security) as well as a thorough outline and analysis of the third EU electricity directive. 
The fourth chapter introduces the Nord Pool electricity market – both the physical 
market and the financial market -- of which Estonia became a member in 2010. This 
chapter also surveys the prevailing academic pricing models of the Nord Pool electricity 
market. The fifth chapter presents an empirical volatility model of Nord Pool electricity 
prices for the years 2008 and 2009. This empirical model is another contribution of the 
thesis. The sixth chapter provides an analysis of the empirical qualitative and 
quantitative findings of the thesis in relation to the research focus of the thesis. The 
conclusion addresses the research question, evaluates the hypothesis, and identifies 
directions for further research on this topic. 
 
 What is an electricity market? 
Broadly speaking, an electricity market can be considered to be the interplay 
between three distinct yet integrated markets: ―a physical market for spot energy (the 
pool), markets for risk-sharing (the contract and EFA [Electricity Forward Agreement] 
markets which trade financial instruments) and a market for capacity‖4. Like other 
commodity markets, an electricity market is governed by basic economic principles; 
indeed, ―the physical aspects of supply and demand play a prominent role in power 
markets‖5. Some peculiarities about the nature of electricity transmission present 
fundamental differences between the spot market for electricity and the markets for 
other commodities, however. The first is that electricity is costly to store; because of 
this, ―market-clearing prices are volatile because inventories cannot be used to smooth 
supply or demand shocks‖, allowing for ―predictable intertemporal [variations] in 
                                                          
4
 Newbery, D.M., 1995, "Power markets and market power", Energy Journal, Vol. 16, No. 3, pg. 39 – 66 
(pg.  43) 
5
 Stoft, S., Power System Economics, New York: Wiley Interscience 2002. 
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equilibrium prices‖6. Because demand shocks cannot be smoothed by allocation and 
reserves, and because of ―the extreme inelasticity of supply and demand‖7, the market 
for electricity is susceptible to extreme price swings. Stoft notes that ―demand is almost 
completely unresponsive to price in most power markets because wholesale price 
fluctuations are not usually passed on to retail customers‖ where prices are regulated 
(Stoft 2002, pg. 43). 
Another feature of electricity transmission which affects its spot market is the 
ability to gauge and price it in real time. This leads to the ―wholesale markets for 
electricity [being] inherently incomplete and imperfectly competitive‖8. Despite a near-
ubiquitous lack of real-time metering and pricing, this demand-side feature of the 
electricity market – contracted as opposed to instantaneous pricing – is merely an 
industry standard and not a necessity of the transmission network. As Borenstein notes, 
―while the technology to monitor consumption on an hourly, or even 10-minute, basis is 
widely available, and has even been installed at many industrial and commercial 
locations, no electricity market in operation today makes substantial use of real-time 
pricing, i.e. charges a customer time-varying prices that reflect the time-varying cost of 
procuring electricity at the wholesale level‖ (Borenstein 2002, pg. 196). Commercial 
and industrial electricity consumers may pay Time-of-Use (TOA) prices, which ―are 
designed to be high when demand is high‖ but are set years in advance and ―miss the 
crucial weather-driven demand fluctuations that cause most problematic supply 
shortages‖ (Stoft 2002, pg. 44). 
The large capital requirements involved in generating and transmitting electricity 
also contribute to price volatility in the electricity spot market. This is because ―a 
significant part of generation costs are fixed‖ (Borenstein 2002, pg. 196), rendering 
marginal costs lower than the average costs of production when a plant is operating 
below capacity – and incentivizing firms to generate electricity so long as this remains 
the case. The result is excess production which puts downward pressure on prices, 
                                                          
6
 Bessembinder, H. and M. J. Lemmon, 1999, “Equilibrium Pricing and Optimal Hedging in Electricity
 Forward Markets,” The Journal of Finance, Vol. 57, No. 3, Jun. 2002, pp. 1347-1382 (pg. 1348) 
7
 Borenstein, Severin, 2002, “The Trouble with Electricity Markets: Understanding California’s
 Restructuring Disaster,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Volume 16, No. 1,  
pg. 191–211 (pg. 193) 
8
 Wilson, Robert, 2002, “Architecture of Power Markets,” Econometrica, Vol. 70, No. 4, pg. 1299–1340  
(pg. 1300) 
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reduces the average price of production to below the marginal cost, and produce losses 
for generators (ibid.).  
The difficulties inherent in electricity storage also affect the market for its risk-
sharing. According to Bessembinder and Lemmon: 
―The inability to store power means that the no-arbitrage approach to pricing 
derivative securities cannot be applied in the usual manner. The well-known cost-
of-carry relationship links spot and forward prices as a no-arbitrage condition. 
However, the arbitrage strategies required to enforce the cost-of-carry relationship 
include purchasing the asset at the spot price and storing it for subsequent sale at 
the forward price. Since this strategy cannot be executed in power markets, 
forward prices for electricity need not conform to the cost-of-carry relationship‖ 
(Bessembinder and Lemmon, 1999). 
Contextualizing this point requires an examination of both the market for 
commodity futures and the cost-of-carry relationship between a commodity‘s spot 
and forward prices. Working defines trading in commodity futures as ―trading 
conducted under special regulations and conventions…which serve primarily to 
facilitate hedging and speculation by promoting exceptional convenience and 
economy of transactions‖9. Because electricity cannot be stored inexpensively, the 
speculation function is not fulfilled by its futures market; Bessembinder and Lemmon 
conclude that, ―although power futures contracts are traded, activity levels are 
extremely low‖ (Bessembinder and Lemmon 1999, pg. 1354) and that ―the power 
markets are not well-integrated with the broader financial markets, that is, that 
outside speculators are not a significant presence in these markets‖ (Bessembinder 
and Lemmon 1999, pg. 1378).  
Bessembinder and Lemmon ascribe this ―lack of integration‖ to two 
phenomena: the high informational setup-costs associated with ―learning about 
power markets‖ and the lack of ―good benchmark price indices on which to base 
cash-settled derivative contracts‖ (ibid.). To the first point, Yang, Bessler, and 
Leatham argue that an ―exact functional relationship exists between cash and futures 
                                                          
9
 Working, H., 1953, “Futures Trading and Hedging“, The American Economic Review, Vol. 43, No. 3,  
pg. 314-343 (pg. 315) 
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prices for storable commodities as described by the cost-of-carry model, whereas no 
such exact relationship exists for nonstorable commodities‖10. This implies that the 
informational setup costs described by Bessembinder and Lemmon might in fact be 
so elusive as to be unattainable, as the myriad, byzantine determinants of electricity 
prices might convince speculators that attempting to forecast futures prices with any 
authority is futile. Because speculators must rely on the ―use [of] other methods (eg. 
weather correlations, consumption prediction) for pricing such derivatives‖11, the 
informational setup costs in electricity forward and futures contract speculation are 
necessarily high. 
The cost-of-carry relationship is a ―standard model of futures pricing‖ which 
―uses a no-arbitrage argument by factoring in the carrying costs involved in holding 
an underlying asset until maturity‖12. Because electricity cannot be stored – and 
―generally, the costs involved in carrying a financial futures contract include the 
interest costs imputed in holding the underlying asset until its delivery date‖ as well 
as ―storage and convenience costs‖ (ibid.)  – the cost-of-carry relationship does not 
strictly apply to the spot and futures prices of electricity. Indeed, ―for contracts 
written on electricity the cost of carry is very large (or infinite) compared to the value 
of the delivered commodity‖ (Weron 2000, pg. 130). 
The impediments to the development of a robust market for risk sharing can 
thus be classified as informational (in that the determinants of demand – weather 
events, behavioral trends – cannot be predicted with certainty) and storage-related (in 
that the cost of carry is large and merely theoretical). For these reasons, the pricing of 
derivative contracts on electricity is not conducted under no-arbitrage assumptions, 
which state that a forward price ―should equal today's price plus interest paid to the 
bank for lending the money plus the cost of carry‖ (ibid.). 
 
 
                                                          
10
 Yang, J., Bessler, D., and Leatham, D., 2001, “Asset Storability and Price Discovery of Commodity
 Futures Markets: A New Look”, Journal Futures Markets, No. 21, pg. 279-300 (pg. 280) 
11
 R. Weron, 2000, “Energy price risk management”, Physica A, No. 285, pg. 127–134 (pg. 130) 
12
 Sequeira, J. and McAleer, M., 2000, “Testing the risk Premium and cost-of-carry hypotheses for
 currency futures contracts“, Applied Financial Economics, Vol. 10, pg. 277-289 (pg. 278) 
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What is electricity market liberalization? 
Electricity sector liberalization is not universally recognized as a positive 
development: ―In many countries electricity sector reforms are incomplete, either 
moving forward slowly with considerable resistance or moving backward, despite the 
success of these reforms in…other countries and regions‖13. This is because 
electricity sector liberalization attempts have not all produced their intended 
consequences – indeed, the electricity market liberalization reforms in California 
have been described as a ―substantial failure‖14.  
Broadly speaking, liberalization is meant to increase the number of 
participants in a competitive market by decreasing government participation in and 
regulation of that market (Armstrong and Sappington 2006). The prevailing pro-
liberalization argument contends that ―market forces produce a better allocation of 
resources and greater effectiveness in the supply of services, the principal beneficiary 
being the consumer, who gets better quality at a lower price‖15. Historically, 
electricity markets, along with other public utilities, existed as ―vertically integrated, 
typically state-owned, franchise monopolies‖16 – but, beginning (comprehensively) 
with the UK in the mid-1980s, many countries began implementing liberalization 
reforms in an effort to reduce the price of electricity (Joskow 2008, pg. 11). The 
stated goal of these reforms was to ―create new institutional arrangements for the 
electricity sector that provide long-term benefits to society and to ensure that an 
appropriate share of these benefits are conveyed to consumers through prices that 
reflect the efficient economic cost of supplying electricity and service quality 
attributes that reflect consumer valuations‖ (ibid.). The ideal end result of network 
utility liberalization reforms is ―for competition to provide both the incentive for 
                                                          
13
 Joskow, P.L., 2008, “Lessons Learned from Electricity Market Liberalization”, Energy Journal, Vol. 29, 
pg. 9-42 (pg. 9) 
14
 Armstrong, M. and Sappington, D., 2006, “Regulation, Competition and Liberalization,” Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. 44, pg. 325-366 (pg. 326) 
15
 European Commission, 1996, “Services of general interest in Europe”, Accessed 16 March 2010 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons_int/serv_gen/serv_int_gen06_en.pdf> (pg. 3) 
16
 Newbery, D.M., 2002, “Problems of liberalising the electricity industry”, European 
Economic Review, Vol. 46, pg. 919-927 (pg. 919) 
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efficiency and the means to transfer the gains to consumers, so that there are no rents 
left for renegotiation and hence no threat to the credibility of the arrangement‖17. 
Laur, Soosaar and Tenno describe the liberalization process as comprising 
three distinct phases: ―privatisation, unbundling and market deregulation‖18 (Joskow 
outlines a more nuanced liberalization prescription consisting of 11 components). 
Privatization is accomplished through the conversion of state-owned assets into 
private enterprises, either fully or partially. Unbundling, as described by Meeus et al., 
is effected by separating the transmission and distribution mechanisms from the 
production and supply mechanisms (Meeus et al. 2005, pg. 28). Laur, Soosaar, and 
Tenno term these mechanisms the monopolistic functions (transmission and 
distribution) and the competitive functions (production and supply) (Laur, Soosaar, 
and Tenno 2003, pg. 213). As explained earlier, unbundling can take two forms: a 
vertically-integrated monopoly is split up into separate private companies along the 
functional boundaries of each of its operational mechanisms, or a vertically-
integrated monopoly remains in tact but separates its accounting functions along 
those same boundaries. Joskow describes this internal separation as a ―Chinese wall‖ 
(Joskow 2008, pg. 12). 
The last phase – market deregulation – can be affected in ―many different 
permutations…to suit national requirements‖ (Laur, Soosaar, and Tenno 2003, pg. 
214). These national requirements are predicated on infrastructure robustness and 
economic responsiveness to market reforms, and the benefits of competition are 
―influenced by technology and initial endowments, and may not be sustainable in 
every utility, nor in all circumstances‖ (Newbery 1997, pg. 359). Whatever the 
prescription or starting condition, the goal of deregulation can be defined without 
much equivocation: ―Deregulation must provide customers with a choice of supplier 
and introduce price competition‖ (Laur, Soosaar, and Tenno 2003, pg. 215). But 
because ―market deregulation‖ as a concept is expansive, vague, and situation-
specific, identifying a precise set of implementation measures is difficult. Joskow 
                                                          
17
 Newbery, D.M., 1997, “Privatisation and Liberalisation of Network Utilities”, European Economic 
Review, Vol. 41, No. 3-5, pg. 357-384 (pg. 365) 
18
 Laur, A., Soosaar, S., Tenno, K., 2003, “Development of Electricity Markets – Options for 
Estonia”, Essays in Estonian Transformation Economics, pg. 211-244 (pg. 213) 
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provides an umbrella description for the measures which can be classified under the 
market deregulation banner: to ―promote efficient access to the transmission network 
by wholesale buyers and sellers in order to facilitate efficient competitive production 
and exchange‖ (Joskow 2008, pg. 13). 
But Jaskow is also quick to point out that some regulation is needed to ensure 
the proper functioning of a competitive electricity market. Joskow asserts that ―the 
performance of the regulated segments [of a liberalized energy market] can have 
important effects on the performance of the competitive segments since the regulated 
segments provide the infrastructure platform upon which the competitive segments 
rely‖ (Joskow 2008, pg. 23). Measured deregulation, as opposed to a complete 
abandonment of government regulation, has been a key component of successful 
electricity market liberalization efforts (Jaskow 2008, pg. 25). And it can be said that 
overzealous deregulation has been at the heart of some failed liberalization efforts: 
―Germany and New Zealand‘s initial decisions to proceed with a liberalization 
initiative without any sector regulator at all, relying instead on negotiated prices and 
the constraints of competition law, were clearly a mistake‖ (ibid.). 
The term ―de-regulation‖ in this context is misleading and somewhat counter-
intuitive. The process could more aptly be called ―re-regulation‖, which better 
describes its purpose: establishing an independent regulatory authority and providing 
it with ―power over the key elements of electricity regulation to promote an effective 
market‖19. The point of this phase is not to abandon regulation altogether, but rather 
to erect regulatory mechanisms sufficient to facilitate the market‘s competitive 
operation. Green et al. describe the four fundamental responsibilities of an 
independent regulator within a liberalized electricity market: ―set network access 
conditions (and thus not to arbitrarily deny market access to new competitors); 
resolve disputes between parties (particularly between generators and network 
companies); determine regulated prices in advance (thus providing clearer incentives 
to regulated firms and reducing the scope for lobbying); and acquire relevant 
information from companies‖ (ibid.).  
                                                          
 
19
 Green, R., Lorenzoni, A., Perez, Y. and Pollitt, M., 2006, “Benchmarking electricity liberalisation in 
Europe”, Electricity Policy Research Group Working Papers, No. EPRG 06/09 (pg. 12) 
10 
 
The saliency of a regulator based upon whether they were appointed or 
elected has been explored academically by Besley and Coate. They describe the 
prevailing literature as assuming that ―that regulators should be more pro-consumer if 
they are directly elected‖20 – and, indeed, their empirical analysis finds that ―electing 
regulators will produce more pro-consumer regulators‖ (Besley and Coate 2003, pg. 
1200). They determined that appointed regulators are more likely to ―reflect the 
preferences of stakeholders in the regulated industry than those of the voters at large‖ 
(ibid.) because regulation is not an actionable issue for the average voter in a general 
election. Working with data from the United States, they conclude that ―states that 
elect their regulatory commissioners have lower electricity prices and raise prices by 
a lower amount when costs increase‖ (Besley and Coate 2003, pg. 1201). 
 
What is energy security? 
Upon deciding to change the power source of the British navy‘s fleet of ships 
from coal to oil on the precipice of World War I, Winston Churchill famously said: 
―Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone‖21. Contemporary energy 
security policy is more expansive than military supply certainty, however; it must 
provide for, at the national level, ―the reliable supply of energy at an affordable 
price‖22. This broad statement serves to define energy security in an abstract sense, 
but two words – reliable and affordable – create problems of application that 
engender the need for a more nuanced (i.e., nation-specific) approach to the topic. 
Yergin contends that, ―although in the developed world the usual definition of energy 
security is simply the availability of sufficient supplies at affordable prices, different 
countries interpret what the concept means for them differently‖ (Yergin 2006, pg. 
70). 
One distinction to make when attempting to define the theme or prevailing 
focus of a country‘s energy security policy is whether it is a net-exporter or net-
                                                          
20
 Besley, T. and Coate, S., 2003, “Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence”,  
Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 1, No. 5, pg. 1176–1206 (pg. 1178) 
21
 Yergin, D., 2006, ‘‘Ensuring Energy Security“, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 2, pg. 69–82 (pg. 69) 
22
 Hughes L., 2009, ‘‘The four ‘R’s of energy security“. Energy Policy, Vol. 37, pg. 2459–2461 (pg. 2459) 
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importer of energy. This is because the security concerns for net-exporting and net-
importing countries are fundamentally different. For net-exporting countries, the 
―‗security of demand‘ for their exports‖ (Yergin 2006, pg. 70) plays a role in their 
energy security strategy in that it represents security of government revenues. In this 
way, securing transmission and production capacity and reliability for export is no 
less important than securing domestic access. 
An interesting case study when considering the energy security strategy of a 
net-exporter of energy is Denmark. Because of its relatively large oil reserves and its 
government-led initiative toward reducing energy intensity and utilization of 
alternative energy sources, Denmark is a net-exporter of energy
23
.  
Table 1: Denmark’s import and export of energy products for 200824 
  Imports and Exports of Energy Products, 2008   
        Imports    Exports   
  Crude Oil [1000 Tonnes] 2364   8657   
  Oil Products [1000 Tonnes] 4460   4675   
  Natural Gas [Million Nm3] 0   5516   
  Electricity [GWh]   12815   11360   
                
  Data: Danish Energy Agency, Author: Eric Seufert 
According to the Danish Energy Agency, the Danish ―degree of self-
sufficiency‖ as it relates to energy production was 130% in 2008 (Danish Energy 
Agency 2009, pg. 23). In the same year, ―Danish energy exports reached record 
heights, [totaling] 64 billion DKK, which is 19% more than in 2007‖25. The sheer 
value of this excess production capacity underscores the importance that energy 
exports have to the Danish economy and identifies the dual nature of energy security: 
                                                          
23
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as a policy initiative, it exists not only for importers protecting supply but also for 
exporters protecting export revenues. 
But most commonly, the term energy security is used to refer to a country‘s 
―energy supplies, the infrastructure required for producing, distributing, and possibly 
storing the energy, and the associated costs to the consumer‖ (Hughes 2009, pg. 
2459). This definition is more common simply because it is more relevant, especially 
in Europe: ―the EU members possess only approximately 0.6 per cent of the world‘s 
proven oil reserves and 2.0 per cent of proven natural gas reserves, and these limited 
reserves are largely concentrated in the North Sea‖26. For the majority of European 
countries, access to and consistency of supply are more appropriate concerns than 
continuity of energy export revenue. Using this broad, Europe-centric approach, the 
supply component of ―energy security‖ in this dissertation will refer to ―the security 
of supply from the global fossil fuel markets‖ (Bahgat 2006, pg. 964) and not to the 
consistency of energy export revenues. 
Multiple approaches exist for ensuring the security of supply. Hughes outlines 
a four-part methodology for explaining the concept of energy security (the four ‗Rs‘ 
of energy security): ―review (understanding the problem), reduce (using less energy), 
replace (shifting to secure sources), and restrict (limiting new demand to secure 
sources)‖ (Hughes 2009, pg. 2459). The review component involves conducting a 
survey of both supply and demand factors, evaluating the time frame for each (such 
as the expected lifetime of a source of energy or the changes in demand over time), 
and the infrastructure requirements of secure transmission. Hughes specifically 
emphasizes the relationship between supply and infrastructure, as each is rendered 
irrelevant in the absence of the other. The reduce component is achieved through a 
reduction in consumption, either through conservation (decreased energy-intensive 
activity) or increased efficiency (decreased intensity of energy activity). Of the two, 
Hughes points to efficiency as being the more sustainable, albeit time- and cost-
prohibitive, of the two options. Hughes also notes that there are limits to the extent 
that reduced energy consumption can affect energy security. The replace component 
is undertaken by diversifying energy supply or altering the energy transmission 
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infrastructure to allow for the employment of alternative sources of energy, or both. 
Finally, the restrict component refers to new sources of energy when demand is 
increasing (such as during an industrialization period) and dictates that new sources 
of energy should be limited to those that are understood to be secure. Again, Hughes 
notes that there are limits to the efficacy of this approach, as a jurisdiction is more 
likely to utilize an insecure source of energy than curtail its growth. While intuitive 
and accessible, Hughes‘ methodology is meant to be a primer for the general public 
and not a policy or economic manifesto:  his approach has ―been employed as a 
means to explain energy security and climate issues to members of the general 
public, and provincial and federal politicians in Canada‖ (Hughes 2009, 2461). 
As was pointed out in the case of Denmark, the concept of energy security is 
not limited to the supply of imports – and, as such, an energy security strategy and 
policy prescription is a necessity for every modern economy, whether or not it is a 
net importer of energy. The focus of this dissertation is Estonia, and the larger 
purview within which this discourse takes place is the European Union and not the 
global market for energy. But to address the energy security concerns of Estonia or 
the European Union, the distribution of the world‘s energy resources and the 
dynamics of the trade in those resources should be explored. As this does not fit 
within the scope of an analysis of electricity market liberalization, a thorough 
overview of worldwide energy dynamics is included in Appendix Section 1. 
 
Justification for Estonian case  
This thesis explores the relationship between electricity market liberalization 
and energy security, using Estonia as the backdrop against which the effects will be 
evaluated. Estonia was chosen as a case study for two specific reasons: 
Electricity independence 
Estonia is electricity independent, importing less electricity than it exports. 
For this reason, Estonia presents an excellent study of the effects of electricity market 
liberalization on energy security because any changes to the competitive atmosphere 
14 
 
or production mechanisms can be attributed to external forces. Changes in price or 
supply to a previously self-sustained market after liberalization, given no other 
fundamental changes in internal dynamics, can be accredited to the impact of new 
market constraints engendered by a more competitive marketplace. For this reason, 
Estonia presents an opportunity to observe the effects of electricity market 
liberalization without having to account for the pre-existing external factors 
influencing electricity prices in a country that imports electricity from abroad. In 
other words, the ―noise‖ affecting the relationship between electricity market 
liberalization and energy security in Estonia is minimal, rendering it a prime 
candidate for academic study. 
Ideal starting point for liberalization 
Estonia has one energy supplier: the state-owned, vertically-integrated Eesti 
Energia. This means that, from a liberalization point of view, Estonia is starting from 
a position of near-abstract market concentration. This also renders measuring the 
effects of liberalization easier because the process has yet to be seriously undertaken. 
The privatization of Eesti Energia, which may take place as early as June 2010
27
, will 
represent the beginning of the process of electricity market liberalization in Estonia. 
The EU electricity market directives affect all EU member states. Estonia was 
chosen specifically as the subject of this thesis because its characteristics offer a 
more ―pristine‖ starting point than in other countries where the process of 
liberalization has progressed farther. This ―starting point‖ condition offers a better 
opportunity to draw theoretical, as opposed to situational, conclusions. Electricity 
market liberalization was chosen because it is a dynamic process currently being 
mandated and undertaken within the EU. The EU electricity market directives render 
this topic attractive for academic study because they present a clear standard of 
proper implementation, providing an objective benchmark for success.   
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Research focus, hypothesis, and methods 
Electricity market liberalization programs face special considerations and 
challenges as a result of electricity‘s unique physical characteristics. Because 
electricity cannot be stored and supply must constantly and simultaneously be 
matched with demand, abuses within a system completely bereft of regulatory 
oversight can have considerable economic and social impact – the infamous rolling 
brown- and black-outs in California over the summer of 2000 prove how drastic the 
consequences of mismanaged electricity market deregulation can be
28
. And these 
consequences are exaggerated by security concerns when the deregulated market for 
electricity is applied at the national level; a liberalized electricity market must be 
capable of meeting ―the over-riding requirement of security and continuity of supply‖ 
(Newbery 1995, pg. 49). 
The focal research question of this dissertation is: What effect does electricity 
market liberalization have on a country’s energy security? The context of this 
dissertation will be bounded by the current liberalization program being implemented 
in Estonia. The Estonian situation was chosen as a case study because the 
liberalization process was started from the point of ―a monopolistic electricity 
market‖ (Laur, Soosaar, and Tenno 2003, pg. 216) wherein the production of 
electricity is accomplished through significant reliance on one indigenous resource: 
oil shale. Because of this, Estonia‘s liberalization presents serious energy security 
concerns and allows a clear link to be drawn between liberalization and the security 
of supply. 
Some concepts will be narrowly defined for the strict purposes of evaluating 
this dissertation‘s hypothesis:  
Electricity market liberalization will be used to refer to the process of 
liberalizing the electricity market within the Baltic and Nord Pool electricity grids. 
While the longer-term goal of the EU‘s energy directive is to incorporate all EU 
member states into a common electricity system, the more immediate result of 
Estonia‘s liberalization reforms will be the unbundling of vertically-integrated 
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electricity providers within the region and the introduction of competitive 
elements into the market so that customers can choose the providers from which 
they purchase electricity. The larger EU-wide ramifications of liberalization will 
not be explored. 
Energy security will be used to refer to the adequate supply of electricity at a 
stable price. While the security of supply of other resources, such as crude oil and 
natural gas, are an important component of a country‘s energy security strategy, 
the research question will be evaluated based on the supply and price of electricity 
alone. 
Given the concepts defined above and the characteristics of Estonia‘s 
electricity supply and energy mix, this dissertation posits the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis: The implementation of electricity market liberalization 
reforms in Estonia will increase prices and contribute to 
greater price volatility and therefore have a negative 
effect on its energy security. 
The hypothesis will be tested empirically through a time-series model of Nord 
Pool electricity prices over the time period of 2008-2009. This model aims to 
measure price trends and volatility characteristics (price spikes, seasonality, etc.) of 
the Nord Pool market, which represents the nearest-term implementation of 
electricity market liberalization for Estonia. This model will be used to test the 
hypothesis; that further integration of the smaller Estonian (and greater Baltic) 
electricity grid into the larger Nord Pool market will drive spot prices and price 
volatility toward the Nord Pool standard. 
 
Contributions of this thesis 
The contributions of this thesis come in two forms: empirical and theoretical. 
The empirical contribution is an updated Nord Pool pricing model, contributing new 
data to the academic study of electricity market price volatility. While academic 
study of the Nord Pool electricity market has been conducted, it was mostly 
17 
 
undertaken during the period starting from the establishment of the Nord Pool market 
through the first expansion phase, from the early 1990s to the early 2000s. The new 
pricing model presented in this thesis will use data from 2008-2009, informing future 
academic study of the Nord Pool market or of electricity markets in general with 
contemporary price data. 
The theoretical contribution of this thesis is broader. As explored in the next 
chapter, which discusses the theoretical framework used for this thesis, the topic of 
energy security is ambiguously defined in the prevailing academic literature, 
focusing primarily on the supply side of natural resources. This thesis will contribute 
a new framework for measuring energy security by including a liberalization element 
in the evaluation mechanism. The prevailing literature identifies two components of 
energy security: supply adequacy and affordability. But this thesis will define energy 
security with a third component, price stability, which can be directly influenced by 
the degree to which a market is liberalized. The theoretical contribution of this thesis, 
therefore, is a more specific, contemporarily-relevant definition of energy security 
which incorporates a liberalization element.  
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1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The prevailing academic literature exploring the topic of energy security 
identifies two components of principle significance: an adequate supply of energy on 
which the infrastructure of a consuming entity can function, and a price point for 
energy which is equally conducive to this functionality (Yergin 2006, pg. 69). But 
the theoretical framework of this thesis is the proposition that a third factor should be 
included in the energy security conceptual consideration: price stability, or the ability 
to capably predict and hedge prices into the future to assure consistent functional 
infrastructure operation. 
 
1.1 Volatility and liberalization 
Volatility, when considered in the context of a commodity market, refers to 
the ―unpredictable fluctuations of a process observed over time in everyday life‖29. 
De-regulated electricity markets exhibit a high degree of volatility as a result of the 
characteristics of electricity. These characteristics include electricity‘s non-
storability, its inelastic demand, its steep supply function, and the pronounced 
reactions of electricity prices to unpredictable exogenous factors including weather 
patterns and natural disasters
30
. Price shocks in the electricity market can be 
substantial as a result of the need to instantaneously match demand with supply in the 
electricity market; ―the English pool price has moved from £11/MWh to £1100/MWh 
over a single 24-hour period, and even more extreme price spikes have been seen in 
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the US‖ (Newbery 2002, pg. 923). Additionally, many liberalization efforts in 
Europe have led to market concentration through mergers and acquisition deals, as is 
explored in detail in Section 4.4 of this thesis. Market concentration in a liberalized 
electricity market can further exacerbate price volatility: ―price spikes are more likely 
to occur when the expected load is high and the level of market power is at its 
greatest…in general, market power will make prices more volatile when a uniform 
price auction is used, and all restructured markets for electricity have adopted this 
type of auction‖31.  
Electricity market liberalization within a political and regulatory environment 
where preventing market concentration is infeasible or impractical creates a situation 
where extreme, short-term variations in price are unavoidable.  Part of this is inherent 
in the characteristics of electricity; part of this is attributable to the abuses of market 
power that ―[exacerbate] the volatility of prices and further [reduce] the chance that 
prices will remain in a reasonable range‖ (Borenstein 2002, pg. 196). Market power 
can be addressed by a regulatory authority, which will be discussed further in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis.  But without massive capital expenditures to both provide 
excess capacity in the event of demand spikes and prevent bottlenecks from forming 
on congested transmission routes, the properties of electricity that lend an electricity 
market to significant price volatility are difficult to overcome. And in a liberalized 
market, producers are discouraged from investing in capacity infrastructure: 
producers are incentivized – and, perhaps, even beholden by their shareholders – to 
offer only marginal capacity during demand spikes (Newbery 2002, pg. 923). Yet 
when supply and demand are mismatched favoring consumers, producers fear that 
the marginal cost of producing electricity might fall below the average cost of plant 
operation given investment in new capacity, as is discussed in Section 1.1. Therefore 
it is the combination of electricity market characteristics and the incentive structure 
of a liberalized market that render price volatility inexorable. 
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1.2 Price signaling and risk hedging in a liberalized electricity market 
Regulated, centralized electricity markets do not exhibit the same erratic price 
behavior as liberalized, de- or re-regulated electricity markets because ―price 
variation is minimal and under the strict control of regulators, who determine prices 
largely on the basis of average costs‖32.  As opposed to in regulated markets, 
producers in liberalized markets price electricity at the marginal cost, and electricity 
is sold at the market-clearing price (Borenstein 2002, pg. 198). As markets have de-
regulated and liberalized, volatility has ―skyrocketed‖ (ibid.), leading to the creation 
of energy derivatives used by energy producers and consumers alike to hedge price 
risks. These financial instruments were created primarily for the purposes of price 
signaling and price discovery, but some ―exotic forms of electricity options can meet 
specific needs for hedging and speculation‖ (Deng and Oren 2006, pg. 951).  
The effectiveness of electricity derivatives in hedging risk has been 
questioned in the prevailing academic literature as a result of the fundamental 
differences between electricity markets and other commodity and financial markets; 
―the number of papers addressing these problems is still scarce and the suggested 
solutions are usually not universal or unsatisfactory‖33. Some of these differences, 
such as seasonality, are explored in Section 5.3, which surveys models of the Nord 
Pool market. But the others – such as ―an overall high level of (sample) volatility, 
oscillating volatility–volatility correlations, daily volatility profiles, multi-
seasonality, and price level-dependent volatility‖34,  as well as the mean-reverting 
nature of electricity prices following short-term spikes —render electricity market 
spot and forward price models (and their associated derivative products) difficult to 
model. These models are also generally incapable of predicting price spikes 
originating from the supply side, which can be caused by any number of factors: 
planned outages, sudden generator failures, unpredictable congestion, and market 
                                                          
32
 Knittel, C. R., Roberts, M.R., 2005, “An empirical examination of restructured electricity prices“, 
Energy Economics, Vol. 27, pg. 791–817 (pg. 793) 
33
 Weron, R., Simonsen, I., Wilman, P., “Modeling highly volatile and seasonal markets: evidence from 
the Nord Pool electricity market, in Takayasu, H. (ed.), The Application of Econophysics, 
Springer, Tokyo, 2004, pg. 182-191 (pg. 190) 
34
 Simonsen, I., 2005, “Volatility of power markets”, Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications,  
Vol. 335, No. 1, pg. 10–20 (pg. 19) 
21 
 
manipulations
35
. Data informing demand-side models is more readily available but 
can be vastly more voluminous, especially when weather patterns and general 
behavioral patterns need to be considered at the regional scale (ibid.). While Pirrong 
and Jermakyan acknowledge that ―the price process for power is not well-captured by 
standard models‖36 used to price interest rate and equity derivatives, they assert that 
demand-side models based on the fundamentals of power consumption can 
accurately predict electricity spot prices if they incorporate a demand risk premium, 
which they find is based primarily on seasonality. This, again, renders short-term risk 
hedging difficult and calls into question whether short-term pricing models ―are 
sufficiently robust to support actual trading decisions‖ (Kirschen 2003, pg. 523). 
It is also unclear whether price signaling can have an appreciable effect on 
demand given the operation of the retail electricity market and the necessity of 
electricity for almost every industrial and residential function. Very large customers 
may purchase electricity directly from retailers at the spot rate, but for small 
customers, the costs incurred in metering and monitoring electricity consumption 
would outweigh the potential benefit engendered by scheduling activities to coincide 
with periods of lower-cost electricity (Kirschen 2003, pg. 522). For large-scale 
consumers of electricity with access to metering technology, price signaling only 
provides a benefit on the short-term when production can be postponed or labor can 
be re-allocated to periods of lower-cost electricity. Kirschen calls this temporal 
demand shift a ―form of storage‖ (ibid.) that must be present to take advantage of 
short-term price signals. He asserts that demand elasticity resulting from demand-
side response to price signaling would help to smooth price spikes and contribute to 
the more efficient operation of the electricity market, but ultimately concludes that 
the monitoring technology required for this short-term responsiveness is not available 
to or viable for the majority of consumers. 
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1.3 The case for price stability as a component of energy security 
The two-component model of energy security is inadequate for describing the 
preconditions necessary for the continuity of operations of an energy-dependent state. 
Given the price volatility inherent in a liberalized electricity market, and given the 
shortcomings in electricity market price models and energy-based derivatives in 
forecasting prices and hedging risks, this thesis proposes a new qualitative energy 
security model consisting of a third component – price stability. 
Model 1: A three-component model of energy security 
 
Author: Eric Seufert 
Price stability – including the ability to forecast prices and adequately hedge 
against price risks – is an integral element of energy-based infrastructure stability. 
Significant price swings coupled with the mean-reverting nature of electricity 
markets renders price forecasting ineffective; this, in turn, inflicts substantial input 
price risk upon electricity-intensive industry participants. And because the market-
clearing behavior of profit-seeking electricity generators is asymmetrical – that is, 
high prices are passed along to consumers during price spikes, but electricity is sold 
at the market clearing price even when the marginal price of production for the 
generator is lower than the competitive price – consumers of electricity in a highly-
volatile electricity market are exposed to unavoidable one-sided price pressure. 
Supply 
Adequacy
Price 
Affordability
Price 
Stability
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Because of the influence of electricity market liberalization on price volatility, 
this proposed model implicitly acknowledges market liberalization as a factor in 
determining energy security. Market liberalization forces can play a role in the 
determination of a state‘s energy security vis-à-vis their contribution to material price 
spikes in that state‘s electricity market. This qualitative model posits that electricity 
market liberalization has a negative impact on energy security by proxy of the unique 
characteristics of a de- or re-regulated liberalization market that lead to price 
volatility and potential market concentration. 
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2. THE ESTONIAN ENERGY SITUATION 
Estonia is relatively energy-independent; nearly 70% of its primary energy 
supply is of domestic origin
37
. The main sources of this domestic energy supply are oil 
shale, firewood, and peat moss; while the roles of wind and solar energy continue to 
grow, they do not yet enjoy an appreciable share of Estonia‘s energy mix. 
A decrease in industrial activity over the period from 1990-1993 precipitated a 
significant drop in energy consumption, but consumption has consistently increased 
since that time (ibid.). Owing to its reserves of oil shale, Estonia is less dependent on 
energy imports than many EU states; that said, key dependencies – especially on oil and 
natural gas imports, which are almost exclusively from Russia – present vulnerabilities 
to Estonia‘s energy supply (Kasekamp 2006, pg. 6): 
 Most of the liquid fuels consumed in Estonia are imported; 
 The entirety of Estonia‘s natural gas supply is imported; 
 Estonia‘s electricity grid is shared between the other Baltic states, Belarus, and 
Western Russia; 
 Estonia‘s production of thermal energy is dependent on the water level in the 
Narva reservoir, which is controlled by Russia. 
These four vulnerabilities pose critical energy security risks to Estonia and are 
manifested out of both political and supply-oriented uncertainty. 
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2.1 Estonia’s energy mix 
Estonia‘s domestic energy supply is mainly concentrated in oil shale, of which 
there are 960 million tons of active consumption resources (Kasekamp 2006, pg. 11). As 
a matter of domestic policy – which is in contrast with EU policy (Laur, Soosaar, and 
Tenno 2003, pg. 216) – the use of oil shale as a source of primary energy will not be 
significantly diminished in the near-term future. Nowhere is this policy better 
highlighted than by the fact that Eesti Energia, the state-owned, vertically-integrated 
Estonian energy company, produced a record-breaking 100 million barrels of shale oil 
in the fiscal year 2008-2009. According to Eesti Statistika, this represented a 2% 
production increase over 2007-2008
38
. It is interesting to note, however, that the use of 
oil shale in electricity production actually fell from 2007 to 2008 – this is because a 
greater amount of shale oil (more than half) was exported, mainly to the United 
Kingdom, Finland, Sweden, Belgium, and Latvia
39. Estonia‘s official stance on oil shale 
production is articulated clearly by Raul Mälk, the former Estonian foreign minister and 
permanent representative of Estonia to the EU. Mälk has said that ―Estonia thinks that 
oil-shale-based electricity production must be maintained, but its share in total 
production will decrease step-by-step‖40. 
Estonia was granted a transition period from the European Commission 
concerning EU directive 2001/80/EC, which mandates emissions levels from large 
combustion power plants – in the case of Estonia, oil shale-fired power plants. The 
transition period will expire at year‘s end 2015, after which Estonian power facilities 
will have to comply with EU emissions regulations. In light of this, Estonia has begun to 
outfit its oil shale power plants with new, circulating fluidized bed combustion 
technology to reduce carbon emissions (Laur, Soosaar, and Tenno 2003, pg. 216). 
Despite these improvements, the mining of oil shale and production of oil shale-based 
energy products has a tremendously negative impact on the environment. Greenhouse 
gas emissions from oil shale production activities are released in greater relative 
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amounts than those from the production of other fossil fuels. This is because oil shale 
production is inherently dirtier than the production of other fossil fuels but also because 
the production of oil shale is less efficient than for other fossil fuels (Laur, Soosaar, and 
Tenno 2003, pg. 216). This has resulted in Estonia having one of the highest levels of 
C02 emissions per-capita in the EU: in 2000, at 10.21 tons, Estonia was third behind 
only the Czech Republic and Finland in C02 emissions per capita (Laur, Soosaar, and 
Tenno 2003, pg. 239). 
Table 2
41
 below presents Estonia‘s energy balance sheet for the year 2008. The 
only energy product for which Estonia was a net exporter in 2008 was electricity; it 
exported 941 GWh against imports of 1369 GWh and total resources
42
 of 11950 GWh. 
The table also reveals that, as a percentage of total yearly resources, the year-end 
reserve stock amounts for each resource are relatively small – only the year-end reserve 
of oil shale exceeds consumption in 2008, and that is only because final consumption 
does not include consumption for conversion to other forms of energy (in the case of oil 
shale, this is the generation of electricity – oil shale accounts for 90% of electricity 
production in Estonia (Laur, Soosaar, and Tenno 2003, pg. 229)). If this line item is 
added back into the final consumption equation
43
, then year-end reserves would fall far 
short of consumption. 
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Table 2: Estonian Energy Balance Sheet, 2008 
                  Data: Eesti Statistika, Author: Eric Seufert  
Russia supplies the majority of Estonia‘s oil and all of its natural gas (Kasekamp 
2007, pg. 6; European Commission 2007b, pg. 1). Graph 1 below illustrates the ratio of 
imported energy products to total energy imports; natural gas and oil imports are 
roughly equal as a share of total imports (Eesti Statistkia 2009, pg. 345). The main use 
of natural gas in Estonia is heating, and the main use of oil imports is fuel (Eesti 
Statistika 2009, pg. 346-347).  
Graph 1: Estonian Energy Imports by Product, 2008 
 
Data: Eesti Statistika, Author: Eric Seufert 
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2.2 Electricity production in Estonia: now and going forward 
As has been pointed out, the vast majority of Estonia‘s electricity is produced 
with oil shale. Table 3 below outlines the fuel consumption in Estonia for electricity 
generation by source for 2008.  While Electricity generated with oil shale represents 
98% of electricity generation, electricity generated through renewable resource 
consumption makes up only 0.07% of total electricity generation for 2008. This amount 
is projected to increase, but the Estonian government has not historically made 
electricity generation through renewable resources a priority: in 2004, Andrus Ansip, 
then Minister of Economic Affairs and Communications and now Estonia‘s Prime 
Minister, predicted that renewable electricity would make up 5.1% of Estonia‘s gross 
electricity consumption by 2010, with that number reaching 10% by 2020
44
. The 
remaining 90% of electricity consumption is predicted by Ansip to be provided in 2020 
by natural gas (15%, up from 6.1% in 2002) and oil shale (75%, down from 91.2% in 
2002). 
Table 3: Estonian Consumption of Fuels in Power Plans for Power Production, 2008 
 
Data: Eesti Statistika, Author: Eric Seufert 
These figures reveal an Estonian electricity sector dominated by the production 
of oil shale products through 2020. While circulating fluidized bed combustion 
technology implements at Estonia‘s oil shale production facilities in Narva are thought 
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to reduce emissions and bring the production of oil shale within the EU‘s emissions 
guidelines, no guarantee can be made that this will happen: the two power generation 
blocks that the Estonian government hopes to upgrade would be the first of their kind 
(Ansip 2004). Recognizing this, Ansip states that ―a final position on the further 
development of electrical production capacities is formed only after the circulating 
fluidized bed combustion technology has been applied in Narva power stations‖ (Ansip 
2004) – meaning that a forecast of the energy mix providing electricity in Estonia can 
only be accurately undertaken after the ability of this new oil shale production 
technology to decrease emissions is evaluated.  
Ansip identifies three alternative electricity production options in addition to the 
implementation of emissions-reducing circulating fluidized bed combustion technology 
on oil shale production facilities: 
1. Applying other emissions-reducing and / or efficiency improving technology to 
Estonia‘s oil shale production facilities, such as ―combustion under pressure, 
mixing of oil shale with other (e.g. also renewable) fuels, large-scale production 
of shale oil and application thereof on the basis of the principle of distributed 
energy production‖ (Ansip 2004). 
2. Abandoning oil shale as a source of electricity production and fundamentally re-
engineer Estonia‘s electricity apparatus, focusing on another source of energy 
such as natural gas or coal. 
3. Engaging with other countries in the region, such as in cooperating with 
Lithuania in the construction of a new nuclear power plant there. 
Each of these options brings with it a set of unknown and unknowable factors. 
The second and third options are roughly consistent with the options discussed by 
Koskela et al.
45
 and are classified there as the Natural Gas Scenario and Nuclear 
Scenario, respectively, and predict the shares of electricity consumption by energy 
source for the year 2020. The Natural Gas Scenario entails importing natural gas from 
Russia as a substitute for oil shale – bringing the share of natural gas as a source of 
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electricity production up to 61% (with oil shale‘s share being reduced to 28.5%) 
(Koskela et al. 2007, pg. 3574). The Nuclear Scenario involves importing nuclear 
electricity from a neighboring country as opposed to investing in domestic infrastructure 
and brings the share of nuclear power as a source of electricity product up to 43%.  
Both the Natural Gas Scenario and the Nuclear Scenario replace the share of 
domestic source of electricity production (oil shale) with that of a foreign source 
(natural gas from Russia; nuclear electricity, presumably from Finland or Lithuania). 
Neither of these scenarios, as envisioned by Koskela et al., foretell a precipitous rise in 
the share of renewable resources above and beyond what was predicted by Ansip in 
2004: for each scenario (including a third Oil Shale Scenario wherein the share of oil 
shale electricity production is reduced to 70%), the share of electricity produced by 
renewable resources is consistent at 10%. It can reasonably be concluded, therefore, that 
any future reduction in electricity produced through domestic oil shale must be met with 
an increase in the use of a foreign source of electricity (outside of the predicted increase 
to a 10% share of consumption by renewable sources of electricity). 
 
2.3 The EU’s energy imports from Russia 
Prior to the Arab oil embargo of 1973, there was little international interest in 
relying on the Soviet Union for energy imports: authoritative, trustworthy information 
was not readily forthcoming from the Kremlin, and political tensions between the 
Western World and the Soviet Union made any level of energy dependence dangerous
46
. 
This is not the case today: Russia is the world‘s largest exporter of natural gas, the 
second-largest exporter of crude oil, and the fifth-largest exporter of coal. Russia also 
holds the most natural gas reserves of any country in the world, the eighth most reserves 
of crude oil, and the second-largest reserves of recoverable coal
47
.  
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Russia‘s status as a globally-significant supplier of energy is relevant not only to 
the energy security of Estonia but to the EU as a whole. EU natural gas production is in 
decline; the bulk of the EU‘s gas reserves in the North Sea will be depleted in 201548, 
and the European Union predicts that gas imports will make up 80% of demand by 
2030
49
. But dependence on Russian natural gas within the EU is not evenly distributed: 
many Central and Eastern European states – including Estonia – are totally dependent 
on Russia for natural gas imports, but the Iberian peninsula imports no natural gas from 
Russia and the UK, which represents the largest market for natural gas in the EU, has 
only imported Russian gas in small quantities (Stern 2007, pg. 89). Table 4 below lists 
the major importers of Russian natural gas within the EU and CIS for the year 2007
50
. 
The 20-20-20 initiative endorsed by the EU in 2008 – which seeks to increase 
energy efficiency and the share of renewable resources in the EU-wide energy mix (as 
compared to 1990 levels) by 2020 – should reduce acceleration of demand for natural 
gas within the EU. Liuhto et al. forecast two natural gas demand scenarios in 2020 given 
the adoption of the 20-20-20 initiative. In the first, with the average price of oil at $61 / 
barrel over 2008 – 2020, the demand for natural gas increased by only 30 bcm per year 
by 2020. In the second, with the average price of oil at $100 / per barrel, the demand for 
natural gas actually decreases (Liuhto 2009, pg. 6). These scenarios do not take into 
account the ―dash for gas‖ precipitated by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS), which incentivizes the use of natural gas over other fossil fuels (ibid.). The effects 
of the 20-20-20 scheme on natural gas imports may be negated by the effects of the EU 
ETS; the competing forces muddle forecasts of natural gas consumption. 
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Table 4: Recipients of Russian Natural Gas, 2007 
 
Data: Energy Information Administration, Author: Eric Seufert 
The geographic disparity in dependence on Russian natural gas imports within 
the EU, coupled with the EU-wide emphasis on alternative sources of energy, puts 
Estonia in a difficult position regarding its ability to negotiate energy imports with 
Russia. As Mälk states, ―the issues of external energy relations and of the connection 
between energy and national security, which greatly worry Estonia, form only a 
relatively small portion of the EU decisions‖ (Mälk 2007, pg. 63). Where the European 
Union has made concerted efforts to wean itself from imports of Russian natural gas – 
both as a result of the oil and gas crises between Russia-Ukraine and Russia-Belarus and 
in an attempt to fight climate change through reduced emissions – the imbalance in 
dependency on Russian imports has left Estonia with a weaker position from which to 
engage Russia. Lucas notes that ―the crucial imbalance is that the Kremlin does not need 
to worry about small East European countries as gas or oil customers. But those 
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countries do need to worry about Russia as supplier‖51. This lack of leverage 
underscores the precarious position Estonia finds itself in with regard to energy prices. 
In 2008, Estonia (along with the rest of the Baltic States) paid $280 / thousand cubic 
meters (mcm) for imported natural gas from Russia – significantly less than the $370 / 
mcm European market price (Energy Information Administration 2010). With regard to 
electricity, Estonian consumers pay the second-lowest prices in the EU; Lithuanian 
consumers pay the lowest
52
. 
This highlights one schism within the EU between the larger, more economically 
powerful states and the newer member states in Central and Eastern Europe. With 
regard to energy imports from Russia, the newer member states look to the EU for 
collective action for greater leverage, whereas the larger states wish to maintain their 
autonomy so as to ensure their own security of supply
53
. The EU has established two 
primary institutional mediums through which to address energy issues with Russia: the 
Energy Charter Treaty and the EU–Russia Energy Dialogue (Belkin 2007, pg. 87). The 
EU-Russia Energy Dialogue was created in 2000 and was the formative discourse over 
energy between the EU and Russia; the Energy Charter Treaty, which has not been 
ratified by Russia, would require Russia to implement a legal framework to govern the 
trade, transit, and investment in energy resources. And despite Russia‘s non-ratification 
of the Energy Charter Treaty – or perhaps precisely because of it – a number of EU 
member states have pursued direct, bi-lateral energy agreements with Russia (ibid.). 
Germany and Italy have both entered into supply contracts with Russia to ensure supply 
quantities; Slovenia, Hungary, and Belgium have negotiated pipeline and gas 
distribution projects with Gazprom, Russia‘s largest company. Not surprisingly, new 
member states such as the Baltic states and Poland have objected to these bilateral 
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agreements (ibid.), claiming that they will provide Russia with increased influence over 
the EU decision-making process.   
Liuhto posits that the power dynamic manifested of the energy trade between the 
EU and Russia is asymmetric and not one of mutual-dependence, claiming that: 1) 
Russia has a greater possibility of diversifying its exports than the EU has of 
diversifying its imports; 2) Russia is a unified seller, whereas the EU is a divided buyer 
(evidenced by the bi-lateral agreements noted above); 3) the EU is more dependent on 
Russian energy than Russia is dependent on EU goods; 4) Russian leadership is free to 
make politically-unpopular decisions, whereas European leadership is not (Liuhto 2009, 
pg. 120-122). Belkin echoes these sentiments, adding that EU energy independence (or, 
rather, decreased Russian dependence) can be achieved in two ways: 1) diversifying its 
energy supply from other regions, such as Norway, the Caspian Sea, and the Middle 
East; and 2) exerting increased regulatory pressure on Gazprom as it becomes a more 
substantial player in the European energy market (Belkin 2007, pg. 88). 
It should be noted that Estonia‘s natural gas supply does not constitute an 
electricity production issue. As detailed in table 3, electricity consumption in Estonia is 
almost completely dependent on oil shale, with the share of natural gas as a percentage 
of electricity consumption being only 0.46% in 2008. But while it is not a significant 
component of electricity production, natural gas is a crucial component of the 
production of heat: in 2006, 46% of all district heating supply in Estonia was provided 
by natural gas, and in some large towns – such as Tallinn, Rakvere, Jõgeva, and Põlva – 
district heating supply was 100% dependent on natural gas
54
. 
 
2.4 The Baltic electricity grid 
The electricity grids of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are interconnected and 
jointly managed. The infrastructure is a relic of the Soviet Union; it also includes the 
Kaliningrad Oblast of Russia, Belarus, and North-Western Russia and was originally 
built as the north-western common power system for the Soviet Union (Estonian 
Competition Authority 2008, pg. 12). The Baltic energy grid operates in parallel on a 
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synchronous AC grid with the United Power System of Russia  and the Power System 
of Belarus; the electricity grid is made up of five high-voltage transmission lines (of 330 
kV, 500 kV, and 750 kV) which form a power loop that can be observed below in Map 
1. In January 2005, the total capacity of the Baltic grid was 8.99 GW, whereas the peak 
demand in 2005 was only 4.12 GW
55
 
The Baltic electricity grid‘s infrastructure is considered strong – it is the only 
electricity grid within the EU which does not experience ―transmission power deficit 
and the so-called bottle-necks‖ (Estonian Competition Authority 2008, pg. 14). The only 
connection that the Baltic electricity grid has with another EU member state is a 350 
MW DC sea-cable connection (Estlink) between Estonia and Finland. Estonia 
specifically has four external electricity grid connections: one with Latvia with a 
capacity of 750 MW, three with Russia for a combined capacity of 1550 MW, and the 
aforementioned 350 MW connection with Finland (ibid.).   
Map 1: The Baltic electricity grid 
 
Source: Estonian Competition Authority 
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The Estlink connection began operating in 2006 and is operated by AS Nordic 
Energy Link, which is a joint venture between four firms: Eesti Energia AS (Estonia), 
owning 39.9%; Lietuvos Energija AB (Lithuania), owning 25%; VAS Latvenergo 
(Latvia), owning 25%; and Finestlink (Finland), owning 10.1% (Estonian Competition 
Authority 2008, pg. 17). Both the Finnish and Estonian electricity regulatory boards, as 
well as the EU, have granted Estlink an exemption from providing third party access to 
the energy it transmits until 2013. The entirety of the available capacity transmitted 
through Estlink is distributed between its owners on a contractual basis; however, if the 
owners do not utilize their contractually-determined capacity, they are obligated to make 
the remainder available to third parties. This is achieved through a next-day ―residual 
capacity‖ auction; project parties submit their usage statistics for the next day, and any 
residual capacity is available for purchase at auction. Nordic Energy Link, a subsidiary 
of Eesti Energi, estimates the capacity available at auction to be 700 MW per day, 
although the actual daily amounts depend on the usage of project parties
56
.  Upon the 
expiration of Estlink‘s joint exemption in 2013, unimpeded access to Estlink capacity 
will be granted to third parties (Estonian Competition Authority 2008, pg. 17). On April 
1
st, 2010, the ―Estlink bidding area‖, a spot market for electricity, opened57. The Estlink 
bidding area is operated by Nord Pool Spot AS, the Nord Pool grid operator, and adds 
further liquidity to the Baltic electricity market by connecting it with the Nordic 
countries of Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland.  
Each Baltic state has a unique electricity production program. The generation of 
electricity in Estonia has already been covered, so it will not be re-tread here. Electricity 
production in Latvia is accomplished primarily through to co-generation of fossil fuels 
(chief among them, natural gas and coal) and hydro-power. Prior to 2010, the dominant 
source of electricity production in Lithuania was nuclear energy – specifically, the 
Ignalia Nuclear Power Plans (NPP), which was closed on December 31
st
, 2009 in 
accordance with Lithuania‘s EU accession agreement (Moora and Lahtvee 2009, pg. 
333). The Ignalia plant, which relied upon the same model of nuclear reactors used at 
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Chernobyl, the site of the worst nuclear catastrophe in history, supplied more than 70% 
of Lithuania‘s electricity.  Before shutting the plant, the total production capacity in 
Lithuania amounted to more than 5000 MW, representing more than double the 
country‘s consumption. But the Lithuanian government predicts that electricity prices in 
Lithuania will rise by more than one-third in 2010 as a result of the plant being shut 
down. To compensate for the electricity once generated by Ignalia, the Lithuanian 
government will increase production at the Elektrenai fossil fuel power plant and 
augment its energy imports from nearby countries: electricity from its Baltic neighbors 
as well as the Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, the latter of which it will also look to for 
additional natural gas imports
58
. 
The majority of the Baltic electricity grid‘s power is contributed from base load 
power stations, such as the Estonian oil shale processing plant Narva Elektrijaamad. 
These base load power stations help regulate the capacity within the grid, as Latvian and 
Lithuanian hydroelectric power stations cannot consistently deliver a sufficient supply 
of electricity. Russia also helps to stabilize the system by contributing electricity from 
its own hydroelectric power stations (ibid.). Short-term tests of system stability have 
been conducted wherein Russia has been disconnected from the Baltic grid; however, 
Russia has not relented to longer-term tests because it would render the Kaliningrad 
Oblast‘s electricity needs entirely dependent on Baltic supply. This reaction evidences 
Russia‘s stake in the Baltic energy grid with regard to the Kaliningrad Oblast‘s 
connectivity: while Russia commits capacity to the grid to ensure sufficient supply 
during peak loads, it also is able to exert influence over the functioning of the grid. 
Russia may be given more opportunities to exert influence over the Baltic 
electricity grid in the near- and medium-term future. Before the closure of the Ignalia 
NPP in 2009, both Estonia and Lithuania were net electricity exporters. But Estonia is 
now the sole Baltic net electricity exporter – and because of the interconnectedness of 
the Baltic grid, dependence of one country on electricity imports renders the entire 
system dependent on electricity imports. Lithuania‘s increased dependency on Russia 
for natural gas and electricity imposes a supply security burden on all three Baltic 
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States, although the Baltic States and Poland have investigated the possibility of 
replacing the Ignalia NPP in Lithuania between 2015 and 2020 (Estonian Competition 
Authority 2008, pg. 92). 
 
2.5 Impact of liberalization on Estonian energy sources 
The Estonian energy situation is explored in this chapter within the context of 
the research question: ‗What effect does electricity market liberalization have on a 
country’s energy security?’. Given Estonia‘s reliance on internal resources, 
predominantly oil shale, in its production of electricity, it faces no supply limitations or 
cost constraints concerning energy security. But the liberalization process will have an 
impact on both of these factors. As discussed, Estonia must decrease its dependence on 
oil shale in electricity production as a condition of its EU accession – and since the vast 
majority of Estonia‘s electricity production is accomplished through the use of oil shale, 
and the Estonian government does not predict that alternative energy sources will make 
up a substantial portion of its energy mix through 2020, it will have to look to other – 
external – sources of electricity to fill the production gap. Additionally, with the shut-
down of Ignalia NPP, the integrated Baltic grid may face a production deficit. As 
liberalization efforts develop, strengthening not only the internal links within the Baltic 
grid but also the links between Estonia and the Nord Pool market, the Baltic grid, within 
which Estonia is inextricably integrated, could potentially face dependence on external 
suppliers. This will inevitably drive the cost of electricity up: Estonian electricity 
provided by oil shale is cheaper than what is sold on the Nord Pool market. Likewise, 
further dependence on Russia will have an effect on the supply component of energy 
security for the reasons outlined above. 
The core effects of liberalization on Estonia‘s electricity production resource 
profile will be increased external dependencies and upward price pressure. External 
sources will be needed to fill the void created by a shift away from the use of oil shale, 
and the cost of these sources will be higher than what can be produced internally. Both 
of these effects will have a generally negative effect on Estonia‘s energy security given 
the model proposed in Chapter 1. 
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3. ELECTRICITY MARKET REFORMS MANDATED BY THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
The European Union‘s electricity market reforms are among the most ambitious 
and sweeping in the world
59
. The origins of liberalization reform in Europe can be 
traced to the early 1990s; they were catalyzed by the ending of the Cold War, which 
rendered natural gas imports from Russia more stable. Liberalization in this 
environment incentivized the construction of new gas-fired plants, which resulted in a 
surplus of supply that further supported liberalization reform. Jamasb and Pollitt 
describe the initial reforms as being implemented through two parallel processes. The 
first involved requiring EU member states to make a number of key changes to their 
national energy markets by a prescribed date. The second involved facilitating the 
establishment of new electricity trading rules between states and establishing new links 
between member states through which electricity could be traded. The new trading rules 
have generally been the domain of industry participants, but the EU itself has subsidized 
some transmission lines between member states. The overarching purpose of these 
policies was to allow electricity providers from across the EU to compete with ―national 
incumbents‖ as well as to reduce the transmission costs of electricity throughout the EU 
– and the broad motivation behind both of these factors was to increase competition 
(Jamasb and Pollitt 2005, pg. 6).  
The first EU electricity market directive
60
 focused primarily on promoting 
competition through the unbundling of production and transmission operations; it wasn‘t 
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until the second EU Electricity Market Directive
61
 that the promotion of regulatory 
authority was included as a major component of liberalization reform. In the 2003 
directive, regulators were given agency over cross-border trade and electricity 
distribution; the 2003 directive also called for the legal separation of vertically-
integrated electricity providers (as opposed to the accounting separation mandated by 
the 1996 directive) and provided all non-household consumers a choice of supplier by 
2004 (with an expansion to all consumers in 2007). Jamasb and Pollitt posit that the EU 
liberalization reforms deviated from ―textbook models‖ in that they did not prescribe 
independent regulatory oversight ex ante; rather, they claim that EU regulatory 
emphasis came late in the liberalization process, ―after the market structure and rules 
were established‖ (ibid.), which led to a disparity in regulatory oversight across the EU-
15 member states. Another diversion from textbook models that they identify is a lack 
of mandated privatization: in some member states, such as France, the incumbent 
monopoly electricity provider has been unbundled but remains owned by the state. 
This chapter will investigate the content and the consequences of the EU 
electricity market directives. The first section will outline the specific prescription of the 
directives within the context of the three components of liberalization reform and the 
extent to which they have been achieved. It will then proceed into a discussion of the 
effects of the EU‘s liberalization reforms in terms of electricity prices, energy security, 
and market concentration. The chapter will end with an overview of the third EU 
electricity market directive, which will be made effective in March 2011. 
 
3.1 Prescriptions and implementation of the EU electricity market directives 
While many member states have implemented the prescriptions of both EU 
Electricity Market directives through national legislation, the EU has been forced to take 
legal action against others for non-compliance. Specifically, the European Commission 
issued infringement procedures against 25 member states for electricity concerns and 21 
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member states for gas concerns in June 2009
62
. Vasconcelos presents a helpful c hart 
which contrasts the way in which the 1996 and 2003 reforms differed
63
; it has been 
recreated in Table 5 below. As mentioned above, the 2003 directive added greater 
regulatory authority to liberalization reforms, as well as mandating choice for more 
customers and instituting the legal unbundling of electricity market operators. It also 
ended the single-buyer model for distribution utilities and mandated regulated third-
party access to distribution networks, thus contributing to a more competitive landscape.  
The European Commission passed a third EU Electricity Market Directive on 
July 13
th
, 2009 which contains five new legal acts and strengthens the regulatory 
framework of the internal European electricity market; however, EU member states are 
not obligated to adopt the measures of the third directive until March 3, 2011. 
This section will proceed with an overview of each of the three elements of 
reform comprising the liberalization process prescribed in the two EC directives – 
privatization, unbundling, and re-regulation – along with a ―benchmark‖ of how 
successful each of those reform measures has been. 
Privatization 
The purpose of the privatization phase is to convert state-owned electricity 
market operators into private enterprises, thus replacing a monopolistic market with a 
competitive one. The key motivating factors behind privatization are to drive prices 
down and allow customers the ability to choose their providers. To this end, while the 
first two EU Electricity Market directives do not mandate the privatization of state-
owned firms, they do stipulate that all EU customers be eligible to choose their supplier 
of electricity. The directives very explicitly provided for the protection of ―vulnerable‖ 
consumers, including measures designed to protect their access to electricity as well as 
institute suppliers of last resort. The directives also emphasized contract transparency, 
mandating that consumer contracts include enough information to make educated 
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decisions about commercial offers and providing for the resolution of conflicts between 
consumers and providers out of court.  
Table 5: A breakdown of EU Electricity Market Directives (1996 and 2003) 
 
Data: Vasconcelos 2004, Author: Eric Seufert 
Because full privatization is not a specifically stated mandate of the directives 
(Jamasb and Pollit 2005, pg. 13), its implementation is difficult to benchmark. One 
method is concentration and market share, which can be measured through the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is calculated by the European Commission 
with a sum of squared shares of individual companies. From 2008-2009, 10 member 
states experienced decreases in HHI (European Commission 2009, pg. 7), although this 
statistic isn‘t revealing of the overall success of privatization implements. A breakdown 
of EU member states by HHI categorization is found in Table 6 below
64
. 
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Table 6: Countries grouped by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
 
Data: European Commission, Author: Eric Seufert 
Another method of benchmarking privatization is tracking the extent to which 
customers in a given member state‘s electricity market switched providers, which can be 
taken as a proxy measure of competition – or, at the very least, a customer base‘s access 
to more than one provider. From 2008-2009, only four member states – Sweden, 
Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Austria – experienced an increase in customers switching 
providers, whereas six member states experienced a decrease. Again, this is superficial 
analysis that does not reveal much about privatization reforms or their effects. If 
anything, it merely underscores the fact that privatization is difficult to benchmark, 
especially given the nuanced nature in which it is implemented through the directives. 
Unbundling 
The EU directives prescribe both legal and functional unbundling for 
transmission and distribution system operators. The unbundling of transmission system 
operators (TSOs) and distribution system operators (DSOs) have different benefits. 
Unbundling TSOs is important because they provide the marketplace for the trading of 
electricity, either through a day-ahead power exchange or through load balancing 
responsibilities. Additionally, TSOs are privy to market-sensitive information. These are 
functionally critical elements of an electricity market; if not acting independently from 
the commercial aspects of the market‘s operation, a TSO could discriminate against 
network users or customers through network access, real-time system operation, or the 
provision of crucial information. TSOs must also be incentivized to make capital 
investment decisions based on network need and not commercial viability, which is 
impossible if a TSO is not acting independently of commercial interests. 
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DSOs operate closer to consumers yet still play a critical role in the functioning 
of an electricity market. DSOs collect information from electricity meters and operate 
the exchange of data about suppliers which allows customers to choose their electricity 
provider. If a DSO is not acting independently of the commercial aspects of an 
electricity supplier, then they could influence the decisions of customers with regard to 
provider choice and thus depress the competitiveness of the market. 
The 2003 directive mandated that TSOs be split into separate legal entities and 
be functionally and operationally independent by July 1
st
, 2007. DSOs with fewer than 
100,000 customers were exempted from unbundling requirements (that is, unbundling of 
these DSOs was left to the discretion of the member states); DSOs with more than 
100,000 customers were required to undergo the same unbundling efforts as TSOs under 
the same time constraints. 
As of 2009, 15 TSOs within the EU had had implemented ownership 
unbundling, and some member states had gone further than the unbundling prescriptions 
of the directives. Most member states had made use of the unbundling exemption for 
DSOs with fewer than 100,000 customers; DSOs were slow to adapt the stipulations of 
the directives, but the status of TSO and DSO unbundling in the EU seems stable. It 
seems likely that many member states will have to accommodate their legal frameworks 
to meet the requirements of the upcoming third directive (European Commission 2009, 
pg. 10). 
Re-regulation 
The 2003 directive introduced the establishment of an electricity sector-specific 
regulator for the purpose of implementing ex ante network regulation. The directive 
calls for the establishment of at least one regulatory body in each member state as well 
as the establishment of a European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas, the 
purpose of which is to help the member states coordinate their regulatory efforts and to 
facilitate cooperation among member states.  
While a baseline set up responsibilities was laid out in the 2003 directive, many 
aspects of the establishment of a regulatory body were left vague and open for 
interpretation – such as the possibility of a member state establishing more than one 
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regulatory body, or of the Ministry usurping regulatory authority from a member state‘s 
body (European Commission
65
. The directive broadly establishes the purpose of a 
member state‘s regulatory authority as ―achieving a competitive, secure and 
environmentally sustainable market in electricity‖ (2003-54-EC, article 3.1). The 
directive does not give regulatory authorities explicit access to information held by 
market operators within their jurisdictions.  
 
3.2 Electricity price trends after liberalization 
Wholesale electricity day-ahead and spot prices rose precipitously within the EU 
from 2003 to 2005
66
 -- the period directly following the adoption of the 2003 directive -- 
increasing by approximately €10 per MWh from early 2003 to May 2005. This price 
increase was characterized by early volatility, especially within the Netherlands, Spain, 
the UK, France, and Slovenia; by 2004, however, the wholesale price of electricity in 
most countries had stabilized. Forward prices for electricity, quoted on a ―year-ahead‖ 
basis, also increased substantially throughout 2003 and 2004, with the most dramatic 
changes occurring in the Netherlands and the UK. The European Commission attributed 
these price increases to a perceived increase in demand in natural gas for heating over 
the winter of 2004-2005 but acknowledged that market participants could potentially 
have influenced competitive conditions sufficient to inflate prices (European 
Commission 2004, pg. 22).  
Upward pressure on electricity prices within the EU continued through 2007. 
The price of electricity paid by industrial users increased by more 22% from January 
2005 to January 2007, and the price paid by households increased by 14% over the same 
time period
67
. From 2007 to 2008, electricity prices for household consumers increased 
by 2%, although year-to-year price differentials varied widely across the European 
Union. During this time period, the five member states paying the lowest absolute 
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household electricity prices all exercised price controls, and the member states which 
experienced the largest supply-demand disparity paid the highest absolute household 
electricity prices (European Commission 2008, pg. 8). When controlling for Purchasing 
Power Parity, however, the highest household electricity prices in the EU were paid in 
Hungary, Slovakia, Germany, Cyprus, Denmark, and Poland – all of which, excluding 
Denmark, regulate electricity prices.  
The European Union considered in 2006 the notion that liberalization had not 
facilitated an ideally competitive electricity marketplace – and that the improvements to 
production and generation efficiency precipitated through liberalization reform had not 
yet impacted the end-user price of electricity, especially for large industrial consumers.  
The European Union questioned whether electricity prices were derived through a 
competitive process or dictated by large network operators with considerable market 
influence
68
 
The electricity prices of 2008-2009 were affected by the global recession during 
the same period. Electricity prices rose concomitantly with the price of oil over the first 
half of 2008 but fell disproportionately after the start of the financial crisis. The price of 
Brent crude oil fell by over 70% from €92 / bbl in July 2008 to €27 / bbl at the end of 
2008. The electricity price paid by industrial consumers decreased by, on average, 7 to 
12% in the EU over the first half of 2009, but electricity prices were higher in most 
member states in the first half of 2009 than in 2008. The European Commission 
explained this peculiarity in pricing differences by the time lag through which oil prices 
affect end-user electricity prices, although it also questioned whether the drop in oil 
prices was fully manifested in electricity prices
69
. 
Many factors contribute to the price of electricity, and attributing a year-to-year 
rise in prices on one conditional change is not intellectually justifiable when looking 
only at broad trends. But the asymmetry in the decrease of electricity prices juxtaposed 
with the decrease in Brent crude prices in the wake of the 2008-2009 global financial 
crisis does raise systemic questions about market concentration and the efficiency of the 
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internal market‘s competitive mechanisms. The EU acknowledged this in stating that 
there is ―perhaps an insufficient level of market integration at retail level‖ (European 
Commission 2009, pg. 13). 
 
3.3 Energy security trends after liberalization 
The European Union identified two prevailing reasons that liberalization reforms 
would increase the EU‘s security of supply. The first is that a common internal market 
would provide greater incentives and support for infrastructure investment than a 
confederation of interconnected national networks. This assertion was supported by a 
surplus of generation capacity in 2006 despite year-on-year growth in peak load demand 
of 1.5-2%. The exception in this case were member states in which electricity prices 
were regulated despite growing demand; under these circumstances, inadequate 
infrastructure investment resulting from below-optimal pricing. 
A second justification is that competitive markets encourage diversification, and 
that an integrated internal European market gives European energy suppliers more 
leverage when sourcing energy internationally. This point co-mingles with the first in 
terms of implementation because international energy delivery is predicated almost 
entirely on robust infrastructure. And while improvements have been made to this end, 
the existence of ―energy islands‖ (poorly-integrated regions of the internal market) belie 
complete, pan-EU security of supply. This is being addressed, however, through efforts 
such as the European Energy Programme for Recovery (EEER), which will assist the 
most vulnerable regions of the EU through infrastructure investment from a €2.365 fund 
made available by the European Union (European Commission 2009, pg. 5). 
Additionally, regional connectivity initiatives have relieved transport congestion and 
contributed to optimal load balancing. 
One example of such a regional initiative is the Baltic Energy Market 
Interconnection Plan (BEMIP), an agreement between Denmark, Germany, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland, and Sweden to further integrate the electricity and 
gas markets of those countries. BEMIP was facilitated by the European Union and aims 
to strengthen the energy connectedness of the Baltic Sea region in an effort to bolster 
48 
 
the overall capacity of the EU‘s internal energy market. BEMIP will be achieved in 
three ways: electricity market integration, electricity infrastructure projects to increase 
connectedness, and gas market and infrastructure development. With regard to market 
integration, BEMIP focuses on reduced concentration of supply, increased trading 
liquidity, free cross-border trade, equal market conditions across the region with 
effective universal third-party access, and increased transparency of information and 
capacity allocation
70
.  
The specific infrastructure projects undertaken as part of BEMIP were broadly 
based on the Nordic electricity market and detailed in an Action Plan ―roadmap‖ by the 
participating countries
71
. Three initiatives form the foundation of the infrastructure 
element: 
1. The Nordic Master Plan, which will comprise projects within the Nordic 
countries such as a link between Finland and Sweden (Fenno – Skan II), Sweden 
and Norway (Nea – Järpströmmen), Denmark and Norway (Skagerrak IV), and 
several intra-country development plans (Great Belt in Denmark and South Link 
in Sweden). 
2. Plans linking the Baltic countries with the Nordic countries as well as 
strengthening their connections with each other. These include new links 
between Sweden and Lithuania, Finland and Estonia, and Poland and Lithuania, 
and are all generally considered commercially viable.  
3. New connections between Poland and Germany. These connections are intended 
to reduce ―loop flows‖ – flows of power into and back out of a grid – caused by 
variable wind-generated electricity.  
The gas market and infrastructure initiative will focus primarily on 
diversification of supply routes and sources. The potential projects cited to fulfill this 
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objective are the construction of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facilities, both new 
interconnections between countries and the development of reverse flow capabilities on 
existing connections, and the construction of gas storage facilities.  
These efforts all contribute to increased EU energy security. An integrated grid 
prevents the existence of ―energy islands‖ by enlarging supply coverage, and 
infrastructure projects lead to increased transmission efficiency. By integrating markets 
on the geographic periphery, the EU can alleviate supply dependence on Russia by 
extending spare capacity across the entire grid. Similar developments are unfolding 
across the European Union, with the most comparable agreement having been signed by 
seven Central and Eastern European states in December 2009
72
. 
 
3.4 Market concentration trends after liberalization 
As described by Jamasb and Pollitt, the EU‘s deviation from standard textbook 
liberalization models and lag in mandating regulatory oversight created hurdles for the 
development of a competitive market. One effect of the lag in regulation was the 
accelerated financial integration of the European electricity market: in a survey of 135 
electricity-market merger and acquisition deals from 1998 to 2003, Codognet et al. 
found that the pace of cross-border activity grew rapidly in the two years preceding the 
adoption of the 2003 directive, whereas it had been virtually nonexistent before 2000
73
. 
They determined that electricity providers who pursued cross-border M&A deals 
generally did so in two stages. The first stage is an initial foray into a foreign market 
which may serve only to establish a foothold; the second is further expansion through 
the previously-created foreign subsidiary. The most popular targets of cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions over this period were the Scandinavian countries, Germany, 
Italy, and the Netherlands. Codognet et al. attribute this to the high degree of 
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liberalization in these markets as well as their potential for growth (Codognet et al. 
2002, pg. 156).  
The data in Codognet et al. suggests that vertically-integrated electricity 
producers are the most active purchasers of foreign assets, whereas targets of M&A 
activity, while spanning the entire supply chain, are most commonly distributors 
(Codognet et al. 2002, pg. 159). Jamasb and Pollitt term this phenomenon vertical 
(re)integration and determine that national and supranational regulators have been 
remiss in preventing cross-border M&A activity by vertically-integrated providers 
despite its negative effects (Jamasb and Pollitt 2005, pg. 15). This is supported by Green 
et al., who find that only 17 of 135 M&A deals reviewed were subject to stipulations or 
conditions by a regulatory authority out of concerns over competition (Codognet et al., 
pg. 162). Remedies can be proposed by the active parties in the M&A deal at the end of 
the review process by the regulatory authorities; of the remedies proposed, divestiture of 
some asset were the most numerous.  
The result of this M&A activity between 1998 and 2002 was increased market 
concentration in the hands of some of Europe‘s largest electricity providers. Codognet et 
al. identified a clear trend toward market concentration in the European electricity 
market in 2002, discovering that larger market share leads to correspondingly higher 
growth (Codognet et al., pg. 163 – 166). The crux of the regulatory dilemma in Europe 
is whether deference to prevailing national competition law is sufficient to prevent anti-
competitive developments, or if an electricity-specific independent regulatory body is 
necessary. Bertram finds that complete deference to existing competition law in the case 
of regulating New Zealand‘s electricity and gas markets has resulted in uncompetitive 
prices, with UnitedNetworks, Ltd., New Zealand‘s largest electricity network operator, 
commanding a 347% return on equity in 2001
74
. Green et al. argue that the electricity 
sector specifically requires an independent regulatory body to enforce competition 
(Green et al. 2006, pg. 12), while Newbury contends that, as a classic network utility 
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characterized by a capital-intensive natural monopoly, an electricity market can deliver 
better outcomes to its customers if its regulated by an independent authority
75
. 
In 2008, the market share of the three largest market operators was more than 
80% in 14 member states, in six member states only one operator existed with more than 
5% market share, and in five member states the three largest operators controlled more 
than 90% of electricity capacity (European Commission 2009, pg. 13).  
To this end, it can be said that the 1996 directive was not a totally effective 
implementation of liberalization reform. In fact, it precipitated a mergers and 
acquisitions land grab throughout the European electricity landscape which increased 
market concentration in the hands of a small number of large electricity operators. On a 
larger scale, and with complete, pan-European connectivity, cross-border M&A activity 
may not have posed a problem: a larger market would have been able to support more 
participants if their ability to reach customers across Europe was ensured. But by not 
enforcing regulatory oversight ex ante on a liberalized network that didn‘t yet enjoy 
physical inter-connectedness, the 1996 directive incentivized financial integration over 
physical integration and prompted anti-competitive behavior. 
 
3.5 The third EU electricity legislative package 
The European Parliament published a legislative package which included 2009-
72-EC
76, a third directive governing the EU‘s internal electricity market, on August 14th, 
2009, although a new directive had been proposed in early 2007. The third directive 
repeals the second directive, citing ―obstacles to the sale of electricity on equal terms 
and without discrimination or disadvantages in the Community‖ and a lack of ―an 
equally effective level of regulatory supervision in each Member State‖ (2009-72-EC, 
pg. 1) as the main shortcomings of the existing legislation. The most drastic changes in 
policy introduced in the third directive come in the form of operator unbundling, and 
these will be explored at length. 
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3.5.1 Operator unbundling 
The third directive presents a new operator unbundling regime, consisting of 
three separate models: ownership unbundling (OU), independent system operator (ISO), 
and independent transmission operator (ITO). Although the models differ in how a 
vertically-integrated electricity entity should be structurally altered, they are all meant to 
remove conflicts of interest between electricity producers, electricity suppliers, and 
electricity transmission system operators. The third directive states that the ISO and ITO 
models may only be chosen if, on September 3
rd
, 2009 (the date at which the rules laid 
out in the second directive came into effect), the member state‘s electricity transmission 
network existed as a vertically-integrated entity. The third directive defines a vertically-
integrated entity as such: ―an electricity undertaking or a group of electricity 
undertakings where the same person or the same persons are entitled, directly or 
indirectly, to exercise control, and where the undertaking or group of undertakings 
perform at least one of the functions of transmission or distribution, and at least one of 
the functions of generation or supply of electricity‖ (2009-72-EC, pg. 11) The member 
state may not prevent a vertically-integrated entity from undertaking ownership 
unbundling if it so chooses; at the same time, a vertically-integrated entity may not opt 
for the ISO or ITO models if the member state has deemed ownership unbundling the 
most appropriate. The three models are outlined below. 
Ownership Unbundling (OU) 
The purpose of ownership unbundling is to separate completely the network 
owner and operator from the vertically-integrated entity. This model defines a TSO as 
both the owner and operator of a network and separates its activities from those of the 
vertically-integrated company, which are concerned with the production and supply of 
electricity.  
The OU model is achieved through ownership restrictions: both the TSO and 
vertically-integrated entity may not hold ownership stakes in one another, except where 
four key conditions are met (2009-72-EC, pg. 9). These rules apply universally to both 
public and private entities: 
1) Ownership does not constitute a majority share; 
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2) Voting rights are not directly or indirectly exercised as a result of the ownership; 
3) Through the ownership, the power to appoint members of bodies representing 
the entity are not exercised, such as appointing supervisory board members ; 
4) The supplier has no direct or indirect control over the network operator and 
system, and vice versa. 
Independent System Operator (ISO) 
The fundamental difference between the ownership unbundling model and the 
ISO model is that, under the ISO model, only the network operator is independent of the 
vertically-integrated entity. Under the ISO model, the ISO acts as a TSO and is 
responsible for the operation, maintainance, and further development of the transmission 
network, as well as for ensuring third-party access to the network. The network owners 
is not charged with granting third-party access to the network; likewise, it has no 
responsibilities as concern investment planning in the network, as these tasks fall under 
the purview of the ISO. 
The main task of the network owner under the ISO model is to cooperate with 
the ISO so as to facilitate the full operation of the network. This includes the provision 
of necessary network information to the ISO as well as the financing of the investment 
decisions made by the ISO which have been approved by the regulatory authority. 
Additionally, the network owner should cover the ISO‘s liabilities as concerns the 
condition of the network (but not the management of the network, which is the sole 
responsibility of the ISO).  
Independent Transmission Operator (ITO) 
The rules governing an ITO focus primarily on autonomy; that is, while the ITO 
will remain a part of the vertically-integrated entity, it must make decisions 
independently from it. These rules draw five sets of boundaries between the ITO and the 
vertically-integrated entity
77
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1) Separation of assets, staff, and identity of the ITO: The ITO should be 
equipped with all ―financial, technical, physical and human resources‖ (ibid.) 
necessary to its electricity transmission operations. This means that the ITO 
should be sufficiently capitalized and staffed to handle day-to-day operations 
(and that third-party corporate staff can only be retained under aberrant 
circumstances), that its assets should be separated from the vertically-integrated 
entity, and that it should be branded in such a way so as not to induce confusion 
with the vertically-integrated entity. In other words, the ITO should have the 
capacity for operation independent of the vertically-integrated entity. 
2) Capacity for independent decision-making: The ITO must have the freedom 
to make strategic decisions based on market factors, and those decisions should 
not be influenced by the vertically-integrated company or its subsidiaries. This 
includes raising money from the capital markets, prohibiting subsidiaries of the 
vertically-integrated entity from direct or indirect shareholding in the ITO, 
enforcing market conditions on financial and commercial relations between the 
ITO and the vertically-integrated entity (including loans), and the prevention of 
influence by the vertically-integrated entity on the ITO as concerns external 
obligations. The ITO should ensure that these conditions are met by establishing 
a compliance regime which will interface with the regulatory authority. 
3) Independence of staff and management of the ITO: The management and 
staff of the ITO must operate exclusively in the interest of the ITO. To achieve 
this separation, the third directive states that management and staff of the ITO 
may not have served in any position of responsibility or engaged in any business 
relationship with the vertically-integrated entity (aside from the ITO) for three 
years prior to their employment with the ITO; the same rules apply for a period 
of no less than four years after the termination of employment with the ITO. 
Additionally, management and staff of the ITO may not hold any position of 
responsibility or engage in a business relationship with another component of the 
vertically-integrated entity (including the holding of shares) during their 
employment at the ITO. Management and staff cannot derive any financial 
benefit from any part of the vertically-integrated entity aside from the ITO, and 
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remuneration of ITO employees cannot depend on the activities of the vertically-
integrated company at large.  
4) Supervisory body: A key condition of the ITO model is the establishment of a 
supervisory body charged with making key financial and strategic decisions, 
including levels of indebtedness, dividend issuance, and long-term financial 
plans. The employment rules above governing the ITO‘s management and staff 
apply to at least half of the supervisory board‘s members minus one, with an 
additional rule in place: decisions regarding the appointment, termination, and 
duration of a supervisory board‘s membership must be presented to the 
regulatory authority, which may object within three weeks of notification. The 
regulatory is charged with ensuring the professional independence of the ITO‘s 
supervisory board. 
5) Investment decision and network development independence: In order to 
ensure that the ITO is making the necessary network investments, the ITO must 
present a 10-year investment report to the regulatory authority each year. The 
investment report should outline the elements of the infrastructure network that 
need to be built or repaired over the next 10 years and the timeframe in which 
these investments will be undertaken. It should also contain investment decisions 
that have already been made and which of these will be acted upon in the 
following three years. The regulatory authority will gauge the completeness of 
the investment report and may require that the ITO amend it where necessary. In 
the event that the ITO does not make an investment identified in an investment 
report as being necessary in the following three years, the regulatory authority 
can force the ITO to make the investment, to organize a tender procedure to 
outside investors for the specific investment, force the ITO to institute a capital 
increase to facilitate financing the investment and allow outside investors to 
participate in the capital increase, or any combination of the three. 
The European Commission will evaluate the success of the ITO model and must 
submit a detailed report concerning its implementation to the European Parliament and 
Council on March 3
rd
, 2013. 
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3.5.2 Other prescriptions of the third legislative package 
The third directive addresses three key policy areas in addition to operator 
unbundling: third-party access to gas storage facilities; retail markets; and regulatory 
authorities. As concerns third-party access to gas storage facilities, the directive states 
that storage system operators that take place in supply provision must be legally and 
functionally unbundled. It also is definitive in mandating how storage system operators 
must offer access to third parties, engineer congestion, and allocate capacity; to ensure 
compliance, the directive gives additional powers to the regulatory authorities for 
moderating third-party access to storage – both for traditional gas storage facilities and 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) storage facilities. The directive also lays the groundwork 
for an eventual secondary market in storage facilities
78
. 
The prescriptions relating to retail markets have to do with customer freedom of 
choice and smart metering. The directive states that customers shall not be charged a fee 
for switching providers and details the breadth of provider information that should be 
made available to the customer. The directive identifies a smart electricity metering 
system as a direct contribution to increased customer information and dictates that all 
member states should conduct an economic feasibility assessment of smart metering by 
September 3, 2012. The member states in which the outcome of the economic 
assessment is positive should prepare a smart metering implementation scheme with a 
timeline of no longer than 10 years, under which at least 80% of customers are equipped 
with smart meters by 2020
79
. 
With regard to regulation, the third legislative package defines the 
responsibilities, authority, and duties of regulators much more explicitly and establishes, 
through Regulation 713/2009, the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
(ACER), which will become active on March 3, 2011. ACER will be tasked with 
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overseeing cross-border regulatory issues and molding an integrated European 
regulatory regimen for the internal market as a whole; it will also be tasked with 
monitoring energy efficiency and security of supply issues within the member states. 
The purpose of the establishment of ACER is to facilitate cooperation between the 
regulatory authorities of each member state in an effort to further integrate the European 
internal electricity market. The third directive also instructs member states to name just 
one regulatory authority to handle all regulatory issues pertaining to the electricity (and 
gas) market
80
. 
 
3.5.3 Improvements and implications of the third directive 
The third legislative package was issued as a result of an inquiry into the EU‘s 
energy sector, wherein serious issues were identified with regard to market 
concentration, insufficient operator unbundling, lack of internal market integration, and 
opaque price formation. The third legislative package addresses these concerns – 
especially operator unbundling – and further harmonizes cross-border regulation with 
the introduction of ACER. The combination of stricter yet more diverse unbundling 
rules as well as increased EU-level regulatory cooperation should not only promote 
competition within the internal electricity market but also increase the EU‘s energy 
security. 
The principle changes to electricity market liberalization policy implemented by 
the third directive are the establishment of a stronger set of unbundling schemes and the 
enforcement of stronger cooperation between member states
81
. The European 
Commission has exhibited a clear preference for ownership unbundling in the third 
directive (as well as in previous directives), but the ITO, and, to a lesser extent, the ISO 
model, were introduced as alternatives in markets where full ownership unbundling is 
not a political or economic reality. The ITO model specifically was introduced as a 
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compromise between the EC and eight member states that were willing to guarantee the 
independence of their transmission operators but unwilling or unable to alter the 
operator‘s ownership structure (Scholz and Purps 2010, pg. 39). 
Meanwhile, the European Commission has empowered itself to enforce cross-
border electricity market cooperation with the third directive by establishing ACER. 
ACER will allow the individual member states to coordinate their regulation efforts, 
strengthen cooperation between TSOs within the European Union, and enhance the 
EU‘s position as concerns security of supply and energy efficiency. These regulatory 
measures were implemented because of a recognized structural deficiency in the 
promotion of competition within the internal electricity market (Scholz and Purps 2010, 
pg. 38) and will be used in conjunction with increased enforcement of anti-trust 
regulations.  
The third legislative package should result in a greater degree of operator 
unbundling – albeit not necessarily through the ownership unbundling process – than 
was achieved through the first and second directives. This will result in a higher degree 
of liberalization across the EU, although not to an absolute, abstract extent. For those 
countries in which complete ownership unbundling was originally infeasible or 
unrealistic or both, the third legislative package presents a practical means of 
implementing some unbundling without having to flaunt the ideal. By taking a step 
toward unbundling through one of the new models (ITO, ISO), these countries‘ 
electricity markets will take the critical, practical first step in the process toward 
achieving the ideal. When considering the alternative – inability to completely 
implement the proposed unbundling reforms because of their rigid structure and 
incompatibility with existing electricity market infrastructure in some member states – 
the third legislative package can be seen as more pragmatic than its predecessors and 
therefore more likely to institute real market reform. While not advocating the same 
high standard of liberalization as the first two legislative packages, the third package is 
likely to result in greater absolute results and more progress toward the common goal of 
liberalization. 
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3.6 Effects of EU legislation on Estonia’s energy security 
As they relate to the research question, ‗What effect does electricity market 
liberalization have on a country’s energy security?’, the effects of the EU‘s electricity 
market directives on Estonia‘s energy security are unclear. Ownership unbundling is 
intended to promote competition, and further integration into the wider European 
electricity market will provide Estonia with an increased number of suppliers from 
which to draw electricity – most notably in the short term, the Nord Pool market. 
Ownership unbundling will likewise make Estonia a more attractive partner on energy 
initiatives than if it were to retain a state-owned, vertically-integrated monopoly 
electricity provider. Theoretically, these elements of liberalization should render Estonia 
more energy secure, diversifying its potential sources of electricity and driving prices 
down through increased competition. 
But given historical trends following liberalization efforts, market concentration 
may actually increase within the Baltic electricity grid once liberalization is pursued in 
earnest. And rather than falling, electricity prices have tended to increase following 
liberalization implementations within the European markets. The increased internal 
regulation and pan-European regulator cooperation initiatives proposed by the third EU 
legislative package are intended to keep market power from concentrating, and their 
effectiveness has yet to be determined. It is therefore impossible to predict with any 
certainty the effect that EU legislation will have on Estonia‘s energy security. 
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4. THE NORD POOL ELECTRICITY MARKET 
Nord Pool, the single electricity exchange between the Nordic countries of 
Sweden, Finland, Norway, Finland, Denmark, and Estonia, is the largest physical power 
market in the world
82
. Nord Pool began operating as a Norwegian power exchange in 
1993 following the liberalization of the Norwegian electricity market. Sweden was 
integrated into the exchange in 1996, followed by Finland in 1998, Western Denmark in 
1999, Eastern Denmark in 2000, and Estonia in 2010
83
. Nord Pool is considered one of 
the most stable power markets in the world
84
; in 2009, 287 TWh of electricity was 
transmitted through Nord Pool at a value of €10.8 billion, representing 72% of total 
electricity consumption in the Nordic countries (Nord Pool Spot-a). 
Nord Pool is comprised of two separate functional entities: a physical electricity 
market, operated by Nord Pool Spot AS, and a financial market, operated by Nord Pool 
ASA
85
. Clearing services and derivative products are handled by NASDAQ OMX 
Commodities
86
. All participants who meet Nord Pool‘s requirements are given access to 
the markets and trade on equal terms, although participants must have a physical 
connection to the grid to either supply to or consume from it.   
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4.1 The Nord Pool physical market 
The Nord Pool‘s physical market is comprised of Elspot, which is a ―spot‖ 
market for day-ahead electricity contracts, and Elbas, which is a real-time ―aftermarket‖ 
to the Elspot used for load balancing. On the Elspot, contracts are traded for physical 
delivery over each hour the following day. Each contract guarantees a load, 
denominated in MWh, at a system price (Lucia and Schwartz 2000, pg. 5). The system 
price is derived by finding a balance between bids and offers from the market 
participants through the intersection of the market‘s supply and demand curves. This 
trading method is called equilibrium point trading
87
. System prices are calculated within 
a window of 12-36 hours ahead for the next day: consumers submit bids before the 
auction window closes at 12:00 noon and the system price is calculated, per-hour, for all 
users within the network without consideration of bottlenecks within the transmission 
grid. The system price is therefore a theoretical price at which electricity contracts clear 
for all users within the Nordic electricity grid when bottlenecks do not constrain 
transmission. Because the system price is day-ahead, it can functionally be considered a 
one-day futures contract. Table 7
88
 below outlines the timeline of operations for the day-
ahead spot market on Nord Pool. 
Table 7: Timeline of activities on the day-ahead Nord Pool spot market 
 
Data: Botterud, Bhattacharyya, and Ilic 2002, Author: Eric Seufert 
To deal with the reality of transmission bottlenecks, the Nord Pool market has 
been divided into ―bidding areas‖ – geographic areas that connect to the Nord Pool grid. 
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Participants submit bids directly to their relevant bidding area, which is the area in 
which their production or consumption is physically connected to the network.  A 
pricing mechanism within the Elspot market adjusts prices based on capacity limitations 
between bidding areas through additional area prices; thus, when transmission 
bottlenecks occur between any two bidding areas, the prices in those areas will not be 
equal to the system price. Intra-bidding area congestion falls under the purview of that 
region‘s TSOs.  
Three types of bids can be made in the Elspot: an hourly bid, a block bid, and a 
flexible hourly bid
89
. Table 8 below illustrates the structure of a sample hourly bid form. 
Table 8: A sample hourly bid form 
 
Data: Nord Pool Spot, Author: Eric Seufert 
Hourly bids are submitted in price steps: at each price level, the bidder indicates 
the price for which it would be willing to buy electricity (positive number) or sell 
electricity (positive number). Prices are denominated in Norwegian Krowns (NOK) and 
loads are denominated in MWh. In the above example, this particular bidder is willing 
to buy 50 MWh of electricity for 100 NOK/MWh and is willing to sell 50 MWh of 
electricity for 2500 NOK/MWh at the specified hour. The minimum price change 
between price steps is 1 NOK or 0.1 EUR, and the maximum number of price steps a 
bidder may submit is 64, including bids at the lower and upper technical bid limits 
established by Nord Pool Spot AS. An hourly bid may also be price independent, 
meaning that, over the specified hour, the volume of electricity bid for does not change 
with price. For bidders who wish to buy electricity at low prices and sell electricity at 
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high prices – such as the user depicted in Table 7 -- Nord Pool constructs a linear 
interpolation from the submitted bid/price pairs to determine that user‘s trade volumes.  
 
4.2 The Nord Pool financial market 
Nord Pool‘s financial market, used for price hedging and risk management, is 
comprised of Eloption and Eltermin
90
. The financial market facilitates the trading of 
―futures, swaps, options, electricity certificates, as well as emission allowance and 
certified emission reduction contracts‖91. Futures and forward contracts are traded on 
Eltermin; European options, sometimes called ―swaptions‖, are traded on Eloption, with 
quarterly and yearly forward contracts serving as the underlying security. Contracts on 
both markets are standardized to denominations of 1 MWh for the delivery period, and 
all contracts are settled in cash by the clearinghouse against the system price in the spot 
market – that is, they are not redeemed for physical delivery of electricity. Futures 
contracts are traded with daily and weekly time horizons and forward contracts are 
traded with monthly, quarterly, and yearly time horizons
92
. 
The contracts traded on Eltermin are written using the arithmetic average of the 
spot market‘s system price over a given time interval, deemed the delivery period. The 
delivery period is preceded by the trading period. Futures and forward contracts are 
settled differently during the trading period: market price fluctuations for futures are 
compensated for through participants‘ margin accounts, whereas forward contracts are 
not settled until the delivery period. None of the contracts traded on Nord Pool are 
traded during the delivery period (Koekebakker and Ollmar 2005, pg. 3-4). Futures 
contracts have shorter delivery periods than forward contracts; daily futures contracts 
with a delivery period of 24 hours are available to be traded within the next week, and 
weekly futures contracts with a delivery period of 168 hours are available to be traded 
within the next four to eight weeks. Both contracts are available for peak and base loads, 
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although peak load futures contracts can only be bought with a one-week time horizon
93
. 
The maximum trading time horizon available on the Nord Pool financial market is six 
years. 
Nord Pool acts as a clearinghouse for its financial market by serving as a legal 
counterparty in all contracts, obligating it to accept responsibility for settlement of the 
contract. This reduces counterparty risk and also decreases the settlement period for 
traded contracts
94
. 
 
4.3 Modeling Nord Pool Prices 
Lucia and Schwartz characterize Nord Pool‘s system price as ―highly erratic‖ 
from a study done of daily spot prices between January 1, 1993 and December 31, 1999 
(Lucia and Schwartz 2000, pg. 7). Their sample period produced a high and low of 
423.38 and 14.80 NOK (per MWh), with a median price of 142.57 NOK. The two 
highest prices from the period came on extremely cold days: the highest in 1994 around 
the time of the Lillehammer Olympic games, and the second highest in 1996. They 
found an annualized price volatility of 189% over the period, but they also observed a 
significant difference between cold and warm seasons. Their study measured warm 
seasons to be twice as volatile as cold seasons, with cold seasons experiencing 
significantly more stable prices but with a mean 22% higher than that of warm seasons. 
Lucia and Schwartz‘s study also reveals that price extremes in the Elspot are 
frequent, with the price distribution being positively skewed, revealing that higher 
extreme prices have a greater probability of occurring than lower extreme prices. They 
found that the largest intra-day price jumps, positive and negative, occurred during 
winter, and that excess kurtosis was more than 4.5 higher in cold seasons than in warm 
seasons. They attribute this phenomenon to the shape of the supply curve, which they 
call the supply stack: in periods of high demand, marginal capacity introduced to the 
grid through added generation systems is generally less efficient than the previous 
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capacity introduced (because the most efficient generators are used first). This leads to 
large ―jumps‖ in prices where short-term demand shocks are experienced as a result of a 
sudden, significant change in temperature, with prices quickly normalizing (Lucia and 
Schwartz 2000, pg. 9).   
Despite these characteristics, academic study has been undertaken to attempt to 
model both electricity prices and forward and futures curve dynamics from Nord Pool 
data. Lucia and Schwartz claim that Nord Pool system prices exhibits ―some signs of 
predictability‖ (ibid.), noting that day-to-day, intra-week price increments can help 
predict price increments for that same period of consecutive days up to several weeks in 
the future. They base this phenomenon on demand consistency within the week. They 
also note consistency with intra-day and intra-week price levels, observing differences 
between the price curves and mean values for non-holiday weekdays and non-working 
days (including holidays). Finally, as mentioned earlier, seasonality is shown to affect 
price levels: cold seasons experience a mean system price of 28% higher than warm 
seasons in their survey. This can be explained by increased heating and lighting costs 
incurred as a result of colder weather and shorter days. Lucia and Schwartz determine 
that this seasonal component of electricity prices is taken into account by market 
participants, influencing the price curve for forward and futures contracts. 
Lucia and Schwartz produce a set of one- and two-factor models for forecasting 
the Nord Pool system price. The models begin with the deterministic function F = f(t), 
where t is a constant, time. They then add to the function two terms to capture the 
peculiarities of the Nord Pool market discussed above: 𝐷𝑡 , a binary variable which 
describes whether or not the day in question is a weekend or holiday, and 𝑀𝑖𝑡 , which is 
a binary variable determining the month to which the date belongs for purposes of 
seasonality. The one-factor model based on the spot price is represented through the 
sum of two components: this deterministic function, which is considered to be 
predictable, and a diffusion stochastic process, 𝑋𝑡 . The model is expressed as: 
Equation 1: one-factor electricity pricing model 
𝑃t = 𝑓 𝑡 + 𝑋𝑡  
66 
 
The two-factor model based on the spot price adds a third component: a 
stochastic process describing the behavior of oil prices, 𝜀𝑡 . This process is understood to 
have a long-term equilibrium price level as well as a short-term mean reverting 
component. The model is expressed as: 
Equation 2: two-factor electricity pricing model 
𝑃t = 𝑓 𝑡 + 𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  
Koekebakker and Ollmar contend that electricity forward and futures price 
curves are more difficult to model than for other markets. Their study of six years (1995 
– 2001) of price data for Nord Pool forward and futures contracts finds that a two-factor 
model explains only 75% of the variance in prices, compared to 95% in other markets. 
They also find that the correlation between short-term and long-term futures contracts is 
lower than in other markets. They determine that more than 10 factors are necessary for 
a model to explain 95% of the variance in the price data used.  Koekebakker and Ollmar 
used two models in their analysis: one in which volatility was independent of the 
forward price level, and one in which volatility was proportional to the forward price 
level.  
As mentioned, Koekebakker and Ollmar  find that two factors are common 
across all forward and futures maturities. The first factor is positive for all maturities, 
shifting all forward prices in the same direction. The second factor, however, shifts 
forward prices for short-term and long-term maturities in opposite directions. They find 
that the causes of price uncertainty at the long end (toward the end-point of two years) 
of the price curve have little influence at the short end of the curve; they attribute this to 
the non-storability of electricity, which renders price prediction past the point of 
reasonable supply forecasting nearly futile. Since electricity cannot be stored, they 
argue, and long-term contracts are not correlated with short-term contracts, hedging 
long-term commitments using short-term contracts could produce unfortunate results. 
They determine that the characteristics of the Nord Pool‘s forward curve dynamics, as a 
proxy for all electricity markets, create a difficult and ineffectual environment for price 
hedging. 
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4.4 The effect of further integration into Nord Pool on Estonia’s energy security 
In addressing the research question, ‗What effect does electricity market 
liberalization have on a country’s energy security?’, the effect of Estonia‘s further 
integration into the Nord Pool electricity market will be guided by competing forces. 
Concerning the security of supply element, increasing the capacity of the connection 
between Estonian and Finland will do nothing but increase Estonia‘s energy security: by 
integrating into the Nord Pool market, Estonia will have a larger and more secure pool 
of electricity from it (and the integrated Baltic grid) may draw. But the stability of 
Estonia‘s electricity price may suffer as a result: given that it produces electricity 
sufficient to meet its own needs through the use of an internally-available resource (oil 
shale) by a state-owned monopoly, Estonia currently enjoys stable electricity prices. 
Additionally, spot prices on Nord Pool are generally higher than prices within the 
Estonian electricity market; Estonia will likewise experience a price increase by further 
integrating into Nord Pool. These opposing effects will have an inexact effect on 
Estonian energy security. 
The Nord Pool market was chosen for this analysis for two reasons. The first is 
that Estonia became integrated into the Nord Pool market in 2010 and will expand that 
integration by enlarging the capacity of the Estlink connection with Finland. This 
renders an analysis of the Nord Pool market relevant. The second is that Lithuania, the 
first Baltic state to initiate electricity market liberalization, adopted the Nord Pool 
Spot‘s market model in 200995, powering its electricity market with the same systems 
utilized in Nord Pool. This non-physical integration will ease the process of integrating 
and harmonizing the Baltic and Nord Pool electricity grids. 
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5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NORD POOL ELECTRICITY 
MARKET 
This chapter will introduce an empirical analysis of the Nord Pool electricity 
market for the time period of January 1
st
, 2008 to December 31
st
, 2009. This is the 
period preceding Estonia‘s inclusion in the Nord Pool electricity market; for this reason, 
it serves as a better indicator of the volatility and spot price environment into which 
Estonia will become further integrated as its electricity market liberalizes and the 
capacity link between Estonia and Finland is enlarged. 
The characteristics of electricity markets which differentiate them from other 
financial markets have been explored at length in previous chapters (Chapter 1 and 4), 
but they will be identified again here
96
: 
 Seasonality 
Electricity prices are highly seasonal, with weather conditions and seasonal 
social behavior influencing electricity demand; 
 Price spikes 
Because electricity cannot be stored and supply must instantaneously meet 
demand, price spikes cannot be smoothed; 
 Mean-reversion 
Electricity prices are susceptible to price shocks as a result of weather events, 
but prices generally revert back to their mean following spikes; 
 Volatility clustering 
A common feature of financial markets wherein large changes in price are 
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followed by further large changes and small changes are followed by further 
small changes. 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the volatility of electricity market spot 
prices; for this reason, the empirical model will focus on the volatility characteristics of 
the Nord Pool market. The main academic works used as references in constructing this 
model come from Koopman, Ooms, and Carnero (2007), Knittel and Roberts (2005), 
and Lucia and Schwartz (2000). Koopman, Ooms, and Carnero (2007) explore 
seasonality, price differentials across the different days of the week, and demand-side 
effects on Nord Pool spot prices using a GARCH process. Knittel and Roberts (2005) 
utilize hourly spot prices from the Californian electricity market and similarly use a 
GARCH process in their model. And Lucia and Schwartz (2000) use a two-factor 
stochastic model to forecast spot and futures prices on the Nord Pool exchange. 
 
5.1 The data and descriptive statistics 
The spot price data for the Nord Pool market was retrieved from the historical 
data section of the Nord Spot website. The data is presented from January 1
st
, 2008 to 
December 31
st
, 2009 in one-hour increments. The spot price is priced in Euros. 
Variables attributed to the data are organized as follows: 
 Hour – the hour of the day (on a 24-hour scale); 
 Lprice – the log of the spot price; 
 Sqrtprice – the first square root of the spot price; 
 DayofWeek – the day of the week, from 1-7 (the week starts with Sunday); 
 isWeekday – binary variable describing whether the day is a weekday (1) or not 
(0); 
 WarmSeason – binary variable describing whether the date falls under the ‗warm 
season‘ (i.e. May through September, inclusive) category (1) or not (2); 
 Mon – Sun – seven binary variables, one each for the days of the week. 
A first glance at the spot price data shows considerable skewness. The kurtosis 
value of 4.4 reveals that the data distribution is peaked, or leptokurtic. A positive 
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skewness value of 0.7 reveals a fat right tail, indicating that the mean value of 39.8 is 
greater than the median. An initial analysis also reveals a considerable spot price 
discrepancy between warm and cold seasons, with warm season prices exhibiting a 
lower (and smaller) range, a lower mean, and a flatter distribution than cold season 
prices. Appendix Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the entire dataset as well 
as the specific Warm Seasons and Cold Seasons datasets. Graph 2 below displays a 
histogram of Nord Pool spot prices over the time period, with a normal distribution 
graph superimposed onto it. 
Graph 3 below plots the spot prices over the time period with a color separation 
between Warm Seasons and Cold Seasons. The Cold Seasons exhibit extreme upward 
price spikes whereas the Warm Seasons generally remain more stable.  
Graph 2: Histogram of Nord Pool spot prices, 5 Eurocent intervals 
 
Data: Nord Pool Spot, Author: Eric Seufert 
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Graph 3: Nord pool spot prices, Warm Seasons vs. Cold Seasons 
 
Data: Nord Pool Spot, Author: Eric Seufert 
Graph 4 below compares Weekend and Weekday prices and reveals a similar 
trend: Weekday spot prices, when usage is higher, exhibit extreme price spikes, whereas 
Weekend spot prices remain more stable. 
Graph 4: Nord pool spot prices, weekdays vs. weekend days 
 
Data: Nord Pool Spot, Author: Eric Seufert 
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To get a better visual of directional volatility, the first square of the Nord Pool 
prices is pictured in Graph 5 below. The first square data reveals downward price 
volatility in the Warm Seasons and upward price volatility in the Cold Seasons, as was 
described by Lucia and Schwartz (2000). A histogram of the first square prices reveals a 
fat tail on the left side of the distribution but a spike in density at the right side (Graph 
6). The first square data distribution remains leptokurtic. 
Graph 7 displays the squared price data broken down by day of the week. While 
the graph is difficult to read, it does showcase the fact that the most extreme upward 
price spikes generally occur during the week, whereas the downward price spikes 
generally occur during the weekend. This is also described by Lucia and Schwartz 
(2000). The summary statistics for the first square data by weekday can be found in 
Appendix Table 2. 
Graph 5: First square Nord Pool spot prices 
 
Data: Nord Pool Spot, Author: Eric Seufert 
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Graph 6: Histogram of first square Nord Pool Spot Prices 
 
Data: Nord Pool Spot, Author: Eric Seufert 
Graph 7: First square Nord Pool spot prices by day of the week 
 
Data: Nord Pool Spot, Author: Eric Seufert 
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5.2 The GARCH(1,1) process 
The Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) 
process takes into account excess kurtosis and volatility clustering to provide an 
accurate means of forecasting volatility (and, in financial time series, the covariance of 
returns)
97
. For this reason, it is an appropriate process to use when modeling electricity 
spot prices, which are heteroscedastic (i.e. their variance is not constant over time). 
The GARCH(1,1) process is a derivative of the ARCH process, which was 
introduced by Engle
98
. Given an infinite number of parameters, the ARCH(p) process 
has been shown to approximate the GARCH(p, q) process (where p is the order of the 
GARCH variance term and q is the order of the ARCH error term), which itself is 
approximated by the simpler GARCH(1,1) process. The GARCH(1,1) process is 
fundamentally similar to the Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) 
process, which it has essentially replaced. The EWMA process is described below: 
Equation 3: The exponentially weighted moving average process 
𝜎𝑛
2 =  λ𝜎(n−1)
2 + (1 − λ)µ
(n−1)
2  
The first term, 𝜎𝑛
2, is a measure of current-term variance, and it is a function of 
two lagged variables: the variance in the previous period (𝜎(n−1)
2 )and the squared return 
in the previous period (µ
(n−1)
2 ). Each term is weighted – by λ and (1 − λ), respectively, 
with both weights necessarily summing to 1. 
The GARCH(1,1) process adds another term to the EWMA process: a measure 
of the long-term mean variance (𝜅𝑉𝐿). This term allows the model to predict persistence 
of variance around the mean. The GARCH(1,1) process is comprised of two equations, 
which are described as such: 
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Equation 4: The GARCH(1,1) process 
𝛾𝑡 =  C + εt  
𝜎𝑛
2 =  𝜅𝑉𝐿 + α𝜎 n−1 
2 + βµ
(n−1)
2
 
The first equation represents an estimate of the conditional mean, with a constant 
(C) and an uncorrelated error term (εt). The second equation represents an estimation of 
conditional variance, with a constant (𝜅𝑉𝐿) and terms for variance and return. The 
weights for the second (α𝜎 n−1 
2 ) and third terms (βµ
(n−1)
2
), representing lagged variance 
and return, respectively, are notated with weights α and β.  
 
5.3 Modeling Nord Pool spot prices using GARCH(1,1) 
The hourly Nord Pool spot price data from January 1
st
, 2008 00:00:00 to 
December 31
st
, 2009 23:00:00 was defined as a time series with a delta of one hour and 
the GARCH(1,1) process was run. The results of the GARCH(1,1) process can be seen 
in Table 9 below (the entire process output can be seen in Appendix Table 3). 
Table 9: GARCH(1,1) process results 
 
Table 9 presents the estimated parameters as well as the estimates‘ standard 
errors and tests of significance. All parameters are significant at p-values less than 5%, 
                                                                              
       _cons      .013832   .0002533    54.62   0.000     .0133356    .0143284
         L1.     .0814207   .0046515    17.50   0.000      .072304    .0905374
       garch  
         L1.     .9414407   .0235599    39.96   0.000     .8952641    .9876172
        arch  
ARCH          
                                                                              
       _cons     6.084063   .0016274  3738.53   0.000     6.080874    6.087253
sprice        
                                                                              
                    Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                               OPG
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -12751.81                         Prob > chi2     =         .
Distribution: Gaussian                             Wald chi2( .)    =         .
                                                   Number of obs   =     17538
Sample: 01/01/2008 00:00:00 - 12/31/2009 23:00:00, but with gaps
ARCH family regression
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including the constant. The process results indicate that the GARCH(1,1) model can be 
expressed as: 
Equation 5: GARCH(1,1) results 
C =  6.0841 
α =  .0814 
β =  .9414 
𝜅𝑉𝐿 =  0.01383 
 
         𝛾𝑡 =  6.0841 + εt  
𝜎𝑛
2 =  0.01383 + .0814𝜎 n−1 
2 +. 9414µ
(n−1)
2  
 
Because the three conditional variance coefficients do not sum to less than 1, 
which is required in a mean-reverting variance process, the model indicates two 
things
99
: 
 Variance is persistent and slow to decay (sum of coefficients is close to 1); 
 Variance is not mean-reverting (coefficients sum to more than 1). 
The first revelation of the model is in line with the prevailing academic 
literature; the second is not. This exposes a market which experiences volatility 
clustering and a slow return to mean prices following spikes. The results of this analysis 
are most likely caused by the seasonality of the market and the fact that only two years 
(and five Warm/Cold seasons) worth of data are being investigated.  
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6. ANALYSIS 
This thesis has presented a new theoretical framework for the academic study of 
energy security, examined the issues influencing Estonia‘s energy security by way of 
electricity market liberalization, and produced an empirical model of the Nord Pool 
electricity market, to which Estonia will become further integrated in the near term. 
Against the backdrop of its research question – ‗What effect does electricity market 
liberalization have on a country’s energy security? – this thesis has attempted to 
determine if Estonia‘s consistent access to electricity supplies at a stable and affordable 
price will be affected by its liberalization program. 
The factors identified as elements of a liberalization initiative in this thesis 
produce competing or indeterminable effects on Estonia‘s energy security. Furthermore, 
the historical discrepancy between the theoretical and empirical results of liberalization 
– that is, what should happen versus what does happen – render a resolute, unambiguous 
qualification of the research hypothesis impossible. Therefore, the conclusion of this 
thesis is that both positive and negative effects of liberalization will result in an 
indeterminate net effect on Estonia‘s energy security. The factors explored in this thesis 
are summarized below 
 
6.1 Price point trends 
As discussed in Chapter 3, electricity prices in Europe have generally risen after 
the implementation of liberalization programs. This runs counter to the theoretical 
expectations of liberalization programs: that increased competition would drive prices 
down. But, as also discussed in Chapter 3, liberalization efforts have precipitated intra-
European electricity market concentration through mergers and acquisitions, decreasing 
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competition not only at the national level but at the regional and European levels. The 
European Union has openly questioned whether liberalization efforts in Europe have 
truly facilitated competition, and their implementation of a stricter and broader 
regulatory framework may abate market concentration concerns going forward. That 
said, the effect of higher electricity prices on energy security is negative – but higher 
prices cannot be attributed solely to liberalization. On the conceptual level, 
liberalization should bring about competitive influences which drive market prices down 
– and this has happened in some electricity markets, as was discussed in the 
Introduction. But this has not been the historical case in Europe; post-liberalization price 
point trends therefore require further investigation before a determination can be made 
as to the effect of liberalization reforms on electricity prices. 
It also remains to be seen whether the European Union can adequately enforce 
adherence to its electricity market directives, especially concerning ownership 
unbundling. Increased regulation may keep market concentration at bay, but if member 
countries are allowed to continue to postpone their ownership unbundling obligations, 
the competitive forces which the EU hopes to instantiate within the internal electricity 
market – and which, even in theory, have not been completely proved to decrease prices 
– may never truly develop. EU credibility will have a large impact on the success of 
inter-European electricity market integration, and the EU‘s endless steam of 
increasingly-equivocal and watered-down electricity market directives have yet to 
successfully implement the competitive forces which liberalization aims to catalyze.  
 
6.2 Price stability 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Many Western European countries experienced a 
period of high price stability immediately following liberalization reforms, but those 
periods eventually gave way to stable market prices. Many of these countries, however, 
already hosted a somewhat competitive electricity market, with independent generators 
competing for business. But this is more a symptom of spare capacity than a 
consequence of liberalization; as was discussed in Chapter 1, liberalization introduces 
price volatility as a result of the operational incentives at work in a competitive market. 
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The non-storability of electricity and need for supply to be immediately matched with 
demand in an electricity market presuppose price volatility within a competitive 
electricity market; price spikes are unavoidable, and forecasting models do not yet exist 
which can adequately hedge them away.  
For countries such as Estonia, wherein a state-owned monopoly provider 
essentially operates the market, liberalization will almost certainly produce price 
instability. A state-owned monopoly can mandate price points and capacity and is not 
beholden to shareholders or investors in expanding or repairing infrastructure. This 
ensures a high level of price stability which a competitive market is unlikely to be able 
to match. And especially in Estonia‘s case, where integration into Nord Pool is the most 
relevant near-term expansion into the European internal electricity market, liberalization 
is almost sure to lead to price instability given the volatility of the Nord Pool Spot, 
which was investigated through the academic literature in Chapter 4 and empirically in 
Chapter 5. Chapter 5 exhibited empirically the volatile nature of the Nord Pool spot and 
econometrically described its volatility clustering and non-mean reverting character. 
These competing influences of the price stability effects of liberalization contribute to 
the inscrutability of the effect of liberalization on energy security. 
 
6.3 Stability of supply 
While liberalization can lead to diversity of supply by opening a market to 
external participants, it can also discourage infrastructure investment as was discussed 
in Chapter 1. Electricity infrastructure projects require large capital outlays, and in a 
competitive, volatile environment, generators are rewarded for providing electricity at 
the marginal price during periods of high demand but are punished for having to cover 
large operational costs during periods of low demand. Generators are therefore 
incentivized against infrastructure investment, which can lead to capacity constraints. 
That said, a liberalized electricity market is more likely to attract external 
investment and participation than one which is not privatized or is manipulated by the 
government. Also, diversifying the sources of electricity supply can ensure consistent 
access. In the case of small countries in which former state monopolies once operated 
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the electricity market, more leverage is available for the government to lure external 
investment by providing subsidies or establishing market mechanisms such as price 
floors. Again, these countervailing forces prevent a clear judgment from being made on 
liberalization‘s effects on energy security. 
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CONCLUSION 
The efficacy of this thesis‘ hypothesis, given the competing effects of 
liberalization on each of the components of the energy security model proposed in the 
theoretical framework in Chapter 1, cannot be evaluated. Each element of the energy 
security model is complex and diverges empirically from the predicted theoretical 
outcomes. And these factors are also highly-dependent on a country‘s pre-liberalization 
resource profile and market structure, further confusing the net effect of liberalization 
from an abstract, theoretical standpoint. While the effects of increased prices and 
increased price volatility following a liberalization program induce negative 
consequences on a country‘s energy security, the diversity and stability of supply 
provided by liberalization buttress it. These competing effects differ in magnitude and 
are difficult to quantify. For this reason, the hypothesis can be neither confirmed nor 
denied. 
Estonia is likely to face increased prices and increased price volatility as a result 
of its liberalization program. As explored in Chapter 5, the Nord Pool Spot market 
exhibits volatility clustering but not mean reversion, with a high degree of volatility. 
This volatility, as surmised in the theoretical framework, is difficult to hedge against, 
leaving Estonia‘s economic infrastructure susceptible to a high degree of input price risk 
which could be disruptive to the continuity of operations for electricity-intensive 
industries. Liberalization will however inspire confidence in the Estonian electricity 
market by foreign investors and provide Estonia access to external sources of electricity, 
which it will need to utilize as it adapts to EU directives mandating its reduction of oil 
shale use. While these external sources of electricity will be more expensive than 
internally-produced electricity, they will also provide diversity and security of supply to 
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Estonia. The net effect of these changes on Estonia‘s energy security is impossible to 
predict. 
 
Directions for further research 
This thesis reveals two directions for further research. The first is of the effect of 
liberalization on market price volatility. Very little academic literature is dedicated to 
this topic; most liberalization studies explore the relationship between liberalization and 
prices. But as was proposed in the theoretical framework, price volatility is an important 
aspect of energy security and should be investigated as an effect of liberalization.  
The second is a more thorough empirical study of the volatility of Nord Pool 
spot prices over an expanded time frame and the effect of new participant accession on 
market price volatility. While the empirical study in this thesis did not reveal a mean-
reversion characteristic of Nord Pool spot prices, this is most likely due to the limited 
time frame in which the study was conducted. More data is required before the Nord 
Pool spot can be determined to not exhibit mean reversion, which contradicts the 
prevailing market literature. Also, given that Estonia began participating in the Nord 
Pool spot in 2010, it would be reckless to attempt to glean any insight into the effects of 
its integration into the Nord Pool spot on either price volatility within the Nord Pool 
market or on the price effects within the Baltic grid. Given more data, interesting 
analysis could be performed on both of these points. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix Section 1: Worldwide energy dynamics 
Oil and natural gas fields are not uniformly allocated across the globe: ―proven 
reserves of oil and gas are rather unevenly distributed and only a few countries and 
regions will remain surplus exporting producers in the future‖100. Among these 
countries, a select few control the vast majority of the world‘s oil supply, with ―the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) members—Saudi Arabia, 
Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, 
Angola, and Venezuela—[holding] 75.2% of world‘s oil reserves and [controlling] 
about 41.7% of oil production‖101. The concentration of the bulk of the world‘s oil 
reserves in the hands of an organization like OPEC presents obvious energy security 
concerns, one of which is price fixing. But the diversity of the OPEC countries – 
located on three separate continents and representing multiple forms of government 
and ethnic and religious demographic compositions – calls into the question the 
ability of OPEC to effectively control prices. Indeed, Almoguera and Herrera find 
that, over the period between 1974-2004, ―OPEC cannot be viewed as an effective 
cartel‖102. The contend that, ―as a cartel, OPEC has not been successful in controlling 
oil prices. Indeed, there appears to be no clear consensus in the empirical literature 
regarding OPEC‘s stability as a cartel or its ability to influence prices‖ (Almoguera 
and Herrera 2007, pg. 2). 
                                                          
100
 Correlje, A., van der Linde, C., 2006, “Energy supply security and geopolitics: a European perspective”,  
Energy Policy Vol. 34, pg. 532–543 (pg. 533) 
101
 Gupta, E., 2008, “Oil vulnerability index of oil-importing countries”, Energy Policy, Vol. 36,  
pg. 1195-1211  (pg. 1195) 
102
 Almoguera, P.A. and Herrera, A.M., 2007, “Testing for the Cartel in OPEC: Noncooperative Collusion  
or Just Noncooperative?”, working paper Michigan State University (pg. 23) 
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OPEC‘s ability to control prices may change in the future, as ―the overall picture 
suggests that the supply of non-OPEC oil will decline more rapidly, resulting in an 
increasing call on OPEC oil‖ (Correlje and van der Linde 2006, pg. 533). And as 
OPEC becomes increasingly monolithic in terms of the countries supplying oil to the 
world, the geographic diversity of exporting countries may give way to resource 
hegemony in the Persian Gulf, as this region ―contains about 60 per cent of the 
current proven reserves‖ (ibid.). Put another way, oil exporters in the Persian Gulf, 
with ownership of the majority of the world‘s oil reserves, may be able to exert more 
influence over oil prices as OPEC becomes increasingly important as an exporter.  
An increased level of influence over oil prices by the Persian Gulf is exacerbated in 
terms of energy security risk by the ―high degree of political instability‖ (Gupta 
2008, pg. 1195) plaguing the governments in this region.  Also amplifying the risks 
of the world‘s increased dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf are the logistical 
realities associated with the region: ―About 88% of the Persian Gulf oil bound to 
Asia, Western Europe and United States is transported through the Strait of 
Hormuz…[which is] extremely susceptible to shipping accidents and terrorist 
attacks‖ (Gupta 2008, pg. 1196). 
Energy security risk will also be affected by increased demand for energy resources 
from emerging economies. In ―non-OECD countries like China and India, demand 
for oil is rapidly increasing in association with economic growth and transport needs‖ 
(Correlje and van der Linde 2006, pg. 533). This increase in demand will be met with 
decreased future production and a paucity of spare capacity – the lack of spare 
capacity being a present reality: ―over the past decade…spare capacity was 
increasingly concentrated in Saudi Arabia and recently it has been reduced to 
virtually zero‖ (Correlje and van der Linde 2006, pg. 534). Production decline is the 
result of two factors: dwindling resource availability and a lack of infrastructure 
investment (ibid.). Eight of the top oil producers in the world have already 
experienced a production peak – ―the US peaked in 1971, Canada in 1973, Iran in 
1974, Indonesia in 1977, Russia in 1987, UK in 1999, Norway in 2001, and Mexico 
in 2002‖ (Gupta 2008, pg. 1196). With the exception of Iran and Indonesia, these 
countries are all found within the most stable half of Gupta‘s index of political risk 
ratings of oil producing countries (ibid.). The implications of a lack of spare capacity 
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and decreased production on energy security risk are universally bad: lack of 
production will drive prices up over the long term, and a lack of spare capacity will 
subject energy markets to price shocks. And the long-term result of production 
infrastructure neglect on the cost of energy (and thus energy security risk) to the 
developed world will manifest itself in the investment needed to maintain production 
levels : ―The long-term security of oil supply to the EU and other consuming 
countries, thus, largely depends on the attractiveness and accessibility of producing 
areas like Russia, the Persian Gulf and Africa, to investments…via foreign direct 
investments (FDIs) by the international oil industry, and the ability of the companies 
to bring the oil and gas to the market‖ (Correlje and van der Linde 2006, pg. 534). 
Many countries, however, have exhibited a ―reluctance…to allow FDIs in new oil 
and gas production facilities‖ (ibid.). 
Two bright spots on the supply side of the energy equation create cause for measured 
optimism. The first is Iraq, where the ―the share of oil and gas produced for the world 
market, in Iraq, by private international oil companies will increase considerably‖ 
(ibid.) should the political situation there stabilize. This is far from a given, however, 
and the ―tens of billions of dollars required to bring the industry's output back up to 
its 1978 peak of 3.5 million barrels per day‖ have not been invested as a result 
(Yergin 2006, pg. 3). The second are technological innovations, which are allowing 
for production from previously-unexploited sources of hydrocarbons. This is 
evidenced in ―nontraditional supplies, ranging from Canadian oil sands (also known 
as tar sands) to deposits in ultradeep water to a very high-quality diesel-like fuel 
derived from natural gas‖ (Yurgin 2006, pg. 4).  
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Appendix Table 1 
 
Appendix Table 2 
 
99%        67.13         124.88       Kurtosis       6.972143
95%        57.16         123.71       Skewness       1.169496
90%        52.84         112.73       Variance       83.42518
75%        44.47         110.07
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      9.133739
50%        38.84                      Mean           40.21133
25%        34.32          10.42       Sum of Wgt.       10198
10%        30.23          10.13       Obs               10198
 5%        27.36           9.35
 1%        24.35           9.17
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                            price
. summarize price if warmseason==0, detail
99%        72.79          78.33       Kurtosis        2.97029
95%       68.895          77.94       Skewness       .5445633
90%        63.91           77.3       Variance       210.2546
75%       47.715             77
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      14.50016
50%       36.135                      Mean           39.44003
25%        30.85           1.81       Sum of Wgt.        7340
10%        23.48           1.78       Obs                7340
 5%       18.665            1.4
 1%         9.23            .96
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                            price
. summarize price if warmseason==1, detail
99%        71.22         124.88       Kurtosis       4.430363
95%        64.56         123.71       Skewness       .7146433
90%        56.02         112.73       Variance       136.6416
75%        45.23         110.07
                        Largest       Std. Dev.      11.68938
50%         37.9                      Mean           39.88852
25%         33.1           1.81       Sum of Wgt.       17538
10%        27.51           1.78       Obs               17538
 5%        23.93            1.4
 1%        13.35            .96
      Percentiles      Smallest
                                                             
                            price
. summarize price, detail
   sqrtprice        2520    6.383049     .858343   3.570714   10.61744
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize sqrtprice if wed
   sqrtprice        2520    6.372001     .889819   1.345362   11.17497
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize sqrtprice if tues
   sqrtprice        2496    6.345991    .9647553   1.363818   10.49143
                                                                      
    Variable         Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max
. summarize sqrtprice if mon
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Appendix Table 3 
 Iteration 15:  log likelihood =  -12751.81  
(switching optimization to BHHH)
Iteration 14:  log likelihood =  -12751.81  
Iteration 13:  log likelihood =  -12751.81  
Iteration 12:  log likelihood = -12751.828  
Iteration 11:  log likelihood = -12751.906  
Iteration 10:  log likelihood = -12752.056  
Iteration 9:   log likelihood = -12752.807  
Iteration 8:   log likelihood = -12767.551  
Iteration 7:   log likelihood = -12778.471  
Iteration 6:   log likelihood = -12790.491  
Iteration 5:   log likelihood = -12861.484  
(switching optimization to BFGS)
Iteration 4:   log likelihood = -12878.935  
Iteration 3:   log likelihood = -12910.213  
Iteration 2:   log likelihood = -12953.463  
Iteration 1:   log likelihood = -13151.756  
Iteration 0:   log likelihood = -14854.361  
(setting optimization to BHHH)
(note: conditioning reset at each gap)
Number of gaps in sample:  3
. arch sprice, arch(1) garch(1)
